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GETTING PROPERTY RIGHT: “INFORMAL”
MORTGAGES IN THE JAPANESE COURTS
Frank G. Bennett, Jr.†
Abstract: In Japan’s civil law property system, courts recognize a form of extrastatutory security, the jōto tanpo or “title-transfer security interest,” that is created by
conveying legal title to the creditor, with a promise to restore it to the debtor upon
repayment. Although best known today as a means to providing security in movables,
jōto tanpo was originally an alternative means of mortgaging real estate, and this latter
use of the interest is the subject of this Article.
The two early attractions of the jōto tanpo interest to creditors were 1) the ability to
avoid inefficient procedures for the enforcement of the Code-defined security interests,
and 2) the possibility of enjoying a forfeiture of the collateral upon default. In the 1960s
and 1970s, courts and the legislature sought to control lender overreaching in connection
with several “non-Code” forms of security relating to immoveable property. The jōto
tanpo has survived efforts at reform, and remains as a potential strong-arm device in
high-interest lending and high-pressure debt collection. The two factors that this Article
identifies as inhibiting effective judicial discipline of this category of transactions today
include 1) limitations in Japan’s system of registered title and 2) procedural lacunae that
open the possibility of enforcement arbitrage.

I.

INTRODUCTION

We worked through Spring and Winter, through Summer and through Fall
But the mortgage worked the hardest and the steadiest of us all
It worked on nights and Sundays, it worked each holiday
Settled down among us and it never went away
~American Traditional Ballad1
Among Japan’s so-called “non-Code” security interests, 2 jōto tanpo
claims pride of place as one of the oldest and most finely tuned judicial
accretions to that nation’s civil law. Commonly translated as “title-transfer
†

Associate Professor, Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University. In the preparation of this
research, invaluable comments were received from Bui Thi Mai Lan, Honma Yasunori, Itō Kōsuke, Jimbo
Fumio, Morigiwa Yasutomo, Nakaya Hiroki, Andrew Pardieck, Mark Ramseyer, and Tadaka Hirotaka.
Any errors, omissions, or infelicities are my own doing.
1
RY COODER, Taxes on the Farmer Feeds Us All, on INTO THE PURPLE VALLEY (Reprise Records
1972). Will Carleton is the original author of this ballad. See NEBRASKA FOLKLORE (BOOK TWO) 7-8
(Robert E. Carlsen ed., 1940), available at http://www.nebraskahistory.org/museum/teachers/
material/nebdata/book2.pdf (attributing authorship to Will Carleton circa 1890 and titling the song “But the
Mortgage Worked the Hardest”). See also FEDERAL WRITERS’ PROJECT, NEBRASKA FOLKLORE
PAMPHLETS NO. 16 (1937-1940) (titling the song “The Mortgage Worked the Hardest”); Irwin Silber &
Earl Robinson, SONGS OF THE GREAT AMERICAN WEST 236-39 (1995) (titling the song “The Farmer is the
Man”).
2
The descriptive Japanese phrase for security interests not specified in the Civil Code is hi-tenkei
tanpo.

464

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 18 NO. 3

security,”3 the practice of offering bare legal title as collateral to secure debt
is a long-standing practice in Japan; it has been used to enable transactions
not contemplated by the literal text of the Civil Code since before its
enactment.4 Both movable and immovable property can be the subject of a
jōto tanpo interest. 5 In the latter case, with which this Article will be
concerned, it offers an alternative to other, more orthodox devices, and is
typically chosen for the considerable procedural advantages that it gives to
the secured party.
With respect to real estate in particular, jōto tanpo is an island of
tradition in an area awash with reform. In recent years, legislators and the
courts have engaged in a tag-team effort to rein in high-risk, high-interest
lending, much to the cost of that industry.6 Rate caps have been stiffened,7
marketing efforts restricted, 8 and debt collectors criminalized. 9 Lenders
have even been denied the freedom to take out suicide insurance on their
debtors.10 Judicial decisions that prefaced successive waves of legislation in
this line have attracted some overseas criticism, as evidence of an unhealthy
3

See, e.g., Hideo Morii, Secured Transactions: Title-Transfer Security (Jōto Tanpo), in 3-5 DOING
BUSINESS IN JAPAN §§ 5.01-5.05 (Zentaro Kitagawa, ed. 1980, updated twice/year) [hereinafter Hideo
Morii, Title-Transfer Security].
4
TADAKA HIROTAKA, TANPO HŌ TAIKEI NO ARATA NA TENKAI: JŌTO TANPO O CHŪSHIN TOSHITE
[NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF SECURED CLAIMS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO JŌTO TANPO] 121-22
(1996).
5
John O. Haley, The Preliminary Contract for Substitute Performance: A Reflection of the
Japanese Judicial Approach, 7 LAW IN JAPAN 133, 138 (1974).
6
Andrew Pardieck, Japan and the Moneylenders: Activist Courts and Substantive Justice, 17 PAC.
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529, 580-81 (2008).
7
See Risoku seigen hō [Interest Rate Limitation Act], Law No. 100 of 1954, art. 4, as amended by
Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act Amending in Part the
Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 155 of 1999, art. 3 [hereinafter Amending Act of 1999];
Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinri tō no torishimari ni kansuru hōritsu [Investment Receipt,
Deposits and Interest Rate Regulation Act], Law No. 195 of 1954, art. 5, as amended by Amending Act of
1999, supra note 7, art. 2, also as amended by Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu no ichibu o kaisei
suru hōritsu [Act Amending in Part the Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 115 of 2006, art. 6
[hereinafter Amending Act of 2006]. For a detailed account of recent developments in the law relating to
consumer lending, see Pardieck, supra note 6, at 564-65, 571-80.
8
See Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 32 of
1983, art. 11(2), 15(1), 15(2), 16, 20, 21, 24/6, 48(3), 49(2), 49(5), 49(6), as amended by Kashikingyō no
kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu oyobi shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinri tō no torishimari ni kansuru
hōritsu no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act Amending in Part the Lending Business Regulation Act and the
Investment Receipt, Deposits and Interest Oversight Act], Law No. 136 of 2003 (cited subarticles contained
in the amendments) [hereinafter Amending Act of 2003]; Pardieck, supra note 6, at 564.
9
See Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 32 of
1983, secs. 21(1), 21(2), 49(8), as amended by Amending Act of 2003, supra note 8, art. 47, also amended
by Amending Act of 2006, supra note 7, art. 1; Shusshi no ukeire, azukarikin oyobi kinri tō no torishimari
ni kansuru hōritsu [Investments, Deposits and Interest Rate Regulation Act], Law no. 195 of 1954, art. 5(3),
as amended by Amending Act of 2006, supra note 7, art. 6.
10
Kashikingyō no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Lending Business Regulation Act], Law No. 32 of
1983, art. 12 § 7, as amended by Amending Act of 2006, supra note 7, art. 2.
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judicial activism in the field of commercial relations.11 At the same time, the
doctrine underpinning jōto tanpo against real estate—a security and
collection device favored by lenders of last resort 12 —remains untouched,
despite a well-deserved reputation for severity, and a potential for capricious
abuse.13
A jōto tanpo mortgage is a simple transaction, in which the ownership
of collateral is transferred directly to the lender, with a promise to reconvey
upon repayment. 14 Japanese courts are exceptionally permissive toward
such an arrangement. German law recognizes a like transaction with respect
to real property but encumbered with such formalities, fees, and tax burdens
that creditors do not use it.15 The classic English mortgage has a similar
formal structure, but is encased in elaborate foreclosure proceedings that are
not found in Japan.16 In the United States, the contract for deed closely
resembles jōto tanpo in many respects, but is only available for purchase
money transactions, and is subject to statutory restrictions at the state level17
(beyond which, it has been described by a Reporter of the Restatement of
Property as having “no place in a modern land financing system”).18 There
are practical limitations to the use of jōto tanpo,19 but for better or for worse,
it does not suffer from such legal encumbrances.20
This Article will argue that three factors determine the characteristics
of jōto tanpo: 1) the pressure of commercial custom; 2) limitations in
Japan’s title registration system; and 3) opportunities for enforcement
arbitrage. These factors are stable for the present, but will not necessarily
remain so. Japan is in the midst of an ambitious program of commercial law
reform, 21 in which there is extensive academic participation. 22 Proposed
11
Pardieck, supra note 6, at 380-81 (citing Yuka Hayashi, Japan’s Lending Crackdown May Hurt
Foreign Consumer-Finance Investors, WALL ST. J, Dec. 13, 2006, at C1).
12
See YOSHIDA MASUMI, JŌTO TANPO 231 (1979).
13
See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 215.
14
See, e.g., Imai v. Takachi, 48 MINSHŪ 414, 422 (Sup. Ct., Feb. 22, 1994) (describing such a
transaction).
15
TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 14-15.
16
FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAND LAWS, 132-138 (3d ed. 1896).
17
Grant Nelson, The Contract for Deed as a Mortgage: The Case for the Restatement Approach,
1998 BYU L. REV. 1111, 1117.
18
Id. at 1115-16.
19
See infra Part IV.
20
John. O. Haley has written that the jōto tanpo “corresponds to a common law mortgage”. Haley,
supra note 5, at 134-35. This should be taken as a loose characterization only. As discussed below in this
Article, collateral under a jōto tanpo differs from mortgaged property in that it can be sold at will
immediately upon default, is exposed to the risk of attachment by creditors of the lender, and is not subject
to the restraining force of a persistent equity of redemption.
21
See, e.g., Hideki Kanda, Securitization in Japan, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 359, 360 (1998) (“In
November 1995, Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a drastic reform plan of financial regulation known
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revisions to the Civil Code, spanning property law and the law of
obligations, were presented at the annual meeting of the Japan Private Law
Association23 in October 2008.24 The contemplated scope of this revision
does not extend to law of secured claims,25 but there are certainly indications
of eventual movement in this direction.26
Like the English law of mortgage, the current state of judicially
fashioned rules for jōto tanpo transactions in land—and, by extension, in
movables—cannot be understood without some sense of its historical
foundations. This Article attempts to provide that background, with a view
to improved overseas engagement in this evolving area of Japanese
commercial law.27 Beyond this narrow objective, review of the evolutionary
interaction of procedure and substantive law in this niche of the Japanese
property system may serve as a useful referent for ongoing reform efforts in
countries that have recently expanded the role of property markets in their
domestic economies.
Part I of this Article examines this early period of legal development,
leading up to the adoption of a formal doctrine to justify recognition of jōto
tanpo claims. Part II provides an overview of procedural flaws in the
as Japan’s Big Bang.” (citation omitted)); Peter Lawley, Panacea or Placebo? An Empirical Analysis of the
Effect of the Japanese Committee System Corporate Governance Law Reform, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J.
105, 111 (2007) (“In May 2002, the National Diet of Japan passed legislation amending the Commercial
Code to allow for the committee system corporate governance structure.”); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK
D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL
AND INFORMAL RULES 9, 22 (2004) (analyzing the effects of a reduction in the filing fee for shareholder
derivative suits); Daniel H. Foote, Introduction and Overview: Japanese Law at a Turning Point, in LAW IN
JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, at xx (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (“The extent of change in the legal realm is
exemplified, above all, by one set of events: the Justice System Reform Council of 1999-2001 . . . and the
reforms resulting from that council’s recommendations. Several chapters in this volume describe specific
aspects of the Reform Council’s recommendations and resulting reforms.”); Shōzō Ota, Reform of Civil
Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561 (2001) (providing an account of the drafting process and
context of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1996, with reflections on its likely effects).
22
See Katō Masanobu, ‘Nihon minpō kaisei shian’ no kihon wakugumi [The Basic Framework of a
“Japanese Civil Code Revision Proposal”], 1362 JURISUTO 2, 3 (2008); Tsubaki Toshio, Hashigaki:
honshō tanjō no yurai o chūshin ni [Preface: Concerning the Origin of This Volume], in MINPŌ KAISEI O
KANGAERU [CIVIL CODE REVISION VOICES], (Hōritsu jihō zōkan [Hōritsu jihō Special Issue], Tsubaki
Toshio et al. eds., 2008).
23
The Japanese name for this organization is Nihon Shihō Gakkai.
24
See Katō Masanobu, supra note 22, at 2-4.
25
Id. at 3.
26
Id.; see, e.g., Okino Masami, UNCITRAL tanpo torihiki rippō gaido no sakutei [Finalization of the
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions], 1842 KINYŪ HŌMU JIJŌ 14 (2008) (describing the
plans of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law regarding secured transactions).
27
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the following is a comprehensive list of publications in
English that touch on this area: HISASHI TANIKAWA ET AL., CREDIT AND SECURITY IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 120-137 (Univ. of Queensland Press 1973) (containing a chapter on
“Security Transfers”); Haley, supra note 5; HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 167-168 (1999) (containing a
chapter on “Atypical Real Security Rights”); Morii Hideo, Title-Transfer Security, supra note 3.
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enforcement of civil judgments that became apparent during Japan’s period
of rapid economic growth.
This is an important foundation for
understanding developments in case law. The difficulty of realizing
collateral on default, as well as shortcomings in the substantive law of real
security itself, induced reliance on so-called non-Code security interests, 28
including jōto tanpo. Part III covers the important judicial and legislative
effort in the 1970s to curb the anachronistic remedy of forfeiture, originally
embraced in the early century’s heyday of laissez-faire ideology. Part IV
examines three recent cases of the Japanese Supreme Court involving jōto
tanpo, setting their holdings against functionally similar rules in common
law jurisdictions. This comparison reveals the differing procedural
constraints under which Japanese courts operate, as well as tensions between
transactional efficiency and the jōto tanpo interest. The utility of jōto tanpo
as a real estate security device, and the potential for curtailing its use, is the
subject of Part V. The conclusion attempts to relate this discussion to recent
scholarship touching on Japanese property law.
A.

Jōto Tanpo Was an Unplanned Byproduct of Japan’s Nineteenth
Century Legal Transition

One of the most important transformative measures taken by the
Meiji-era reform government after ousting the Tokugawa Shogunate, in
1868, was the settlement of ownership deeds to land.29 In the previous era,
farmers were bound to their holdings in principle 30 and transfers of land
were possible only under narrowly circumscribed conditions.31 The issuance
of land deeds undermined the old order by making land freely alienable.32
However, the government’s more immediate objective was fiscal; the
ownership scheme provided a platform for the implementation of an annual
cash tax on land, needed by the young government to cover the significant
costs of co-opting stakeholders in the preexisting regime such as the samurai

28
See 4 SHIN HANREI KOMENTĀRU MINPŌ [COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT] 91-92
(Shinozuka Shōji & Maeda Tatsuaki eds. 1991) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT].
29
See ISHII RYŌSUKE, JAPANESE CULTURE IN THE MEIJI ERA: LEGISLATION IN THE MEIJI ERA 180
(William Chambliss trans., 1958).
30
See LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN: INTRODUCTION 12-13 (John Henry Wigmore ed.,
1969); LAW AND JUSTICE IN TOKUGAWA JAPAN: CIVIL CUSTOMARY LAW 11 (John Henry Wigmore ed.,
1967).
31
See Fujiwara Akihisa, Meiji shoki ni okeru tochi tanpo hō no keisei [The Formation of Mortgage
Law in the Early Meiji Period], 24 KOBE HŌGAKU ZASSHI 203, 214-15 (1974) [hereinafter Fujiwara Akihisa,
Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period].
32
See ISHII RYŌSUKE, supra note 29, at 180.
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(whose stipends were cashed out by the new government).33 An ordinance
promulgated on July 28, 1873 ultimately established this tax and ownership
system.34 The rules of ownership that underpinned this ordinance emerged
in a flurry of orders issued over the course of the preceding year.
The foundation order removing restraints on alienation was given by
the Grand Council of State on February 15, 1872.35 The first order on the
issuance of land deeds was made by the Ministry of Finance on February 24,
1872,36 but was replaced by a revising order on July 4 of the same year.37
Neither of the two implementing orders specified which party to a mortgage
should receive the land deed issued by the state, despite the fact that such
arrangements were common at the village level in Tokugawa Japan.38 In
response to consternation at the local level, an interim memorandum on
mortgages was sent out to local officials on June 18, 1872. 39 This was
replaced by a regulation issued by the Grand Council of State in the
following year, on January 17, 1873,40 and was clarified by a further order
on February 14, 1873.41 As this progression of events illustrates, reformers
were forced to adapt the emergent system of marketable title and security to
the contours of preexisting feudal interests.
B.

Prior Law Distinguished True Security Arrangements from Fictional
Foreclosures

Mortgages at the end of the Tokugawa period were of two types, each
associated with a distinctive procedure and enforcement mechanism. 42
Interests which were subject to a closely circumscribed and recorded “main
suit” procedure were enforced through a forfeiture of the borrower’s interest
33
See Stephen Vlastos, Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF JAPAN: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 367, 373-74 (Marius B. Jansen & John Whitney Hall eds.,
1989).
34
Chiso kaisei jōrei [Land Reform Ordinance], Dajōkan Ordinance No. 272 of 1873.
35
Jisho eidai baibai o yurusu [Permanent Sales of Estates to be Permitted], Dajōkan Ordinance No.
50 of 1872.
36
Jisho baibai jōto ni tsuki chiken watashikata kisoku [Regulation on the Provision of Deeds for the
Conveyance of Estates], Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 25 of 1872.
37
Ministry of Finance Regulation No. 83 of 1872.
38
Fujiwara Akihisa, Chiso kaisei ni okeru shichichi kannkei no shobun [On the Disposition of
Security Relationships in the Process of the Land-Tax Reform], 25 KOBE HŌGAKU ZASSHI 1, 2-3 (1975)
[hereinafter Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships].
39
Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 215.
40
Jisho shichiire kakiire kisoku [Rules for the Mortgage and Pledge of Estates], Dajōkan Ordinance
No. 18 of 1873.
41
See Dajōkan Ordinance No. 51 of 1873. See Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security
Relationships, supra note 38, at 4-5.
42
See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 204.
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in the land by a form of absolute foreclosure.43 Such agreements were often
collusive; the lender typically went into possession at the time the loan was
made, and used a later claim for direct foreclosure to circumvent the general
ban on land transfers.44 In such transactions, the period under the “loan”
might be characterized in modern terms as a protracted escrow, because the
true intention of the parties was to transfer title, and ultimate proprietorship
was ambiguous before the transfer was finalized. Mortgages not in this
category were enforceable through a less closely regulated “money suit”
procedure,45 where the remedy was to extract payment through an auction of
the collateral, with the residue being restored to the debtor.46 These latter
were genuine lending arrangements, in which the debtor remained in
possession during the term of the loan.47
The initial rules on the settlement of deeds were found lacking on two
issues. First, the settlement of title itself demanded resolution of the
competing claims of would-be “main suit” lenders and their debtors. 48
Second, it was necessary to clarify the respective remedy or remedies (i.e.
sale by auction or direct foreclosure) to be applied to security arrangements
entered into before, and after, the watershed date of February 15, 1872 (the
point at which restraints on alienation were lifted).49 The memorandum of
June 1872 and the string of regulations issuing from January 1873 addressed
these issues.
The first memorandum of June 1872, issued by the Ministry of
Finance, provided, in effect, that the rules set forth in the formal law of the
Tokugawa (kujikata osadamegaki) 50 be applied uniformly to all mortgage
arrangements, including lender-in-possession cases in which the underlying

43
See id. at 223-24; Fujiwara Akihisa, Shichichi kosaku no hōteki kōzō to jinushisei [The Legal
Structure of Tenancy Pledges and Its Relation to the Landholder System], 22 KOBE HŌGAKU ZASSHI Nos. 3
& 4, at 1, 19-21 (1973) [hereinafter Fujiwara Akihisa, Tenancy Pledges].
44
See Ōmi Kōji, Wagakuni ni okeru jōto tanpo no seiritsu katei: nihon tanpo hō shi ni okeru jōto
tanpo no ichizuke (1) [The Establishment of Jōto Tanpo in the Law of Our Nation: The Posture of Jōto
Tanpo in Japanese Legal History (1)], 27 WASEDA HŌGAKKAISHI 159, 165-66, 171-72 (1976).
45
Id. at 173.
46
Id.
47
See generally Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38 (providing a
detailed account of difficulties that arose at the prefectural level in implementing national rules that treated
all pledgors as legal title holders, when in fact some were genuine borrowers and remained in possession,
and some entered into the lending transaction intending to surrender their interest, and had ceded
possession to the lender).
48
See Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38, at 4.
49
See id.
50
See OSADAMEGAKI GEKAN [OSAKAMEGAKI, BOOK 2], TOKUGAWA KINREIKŌ BEKKAN
[PROHIBITIONS OF THE TOKUGAWA, SUPPLEMENT], sec. 31 at 72-74 (Ishii Ryōsuke ed., 1961), translated in
41 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOC’Y OF JAPAN 683, 717-21 (John Carey Hall trans., 1913).
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loan was (arguably) a legal fiction.51 This simplified the settling of title; the
deed for any property subject to mortgage, of whatever type, was to be
issued to the mortgagor. 52 After issuance, where the lender was in
possession, the deed was to be delivered to him (voluntarily), to be held
during the term of the loan arrangement.53 This memorandum was but a
stopgap measure. The bifurcation of “main suit” and “money suit”
procedures had been, in effect, a system of strict pleading with two
streams. 54 More detailed guidance would be required to give the new
national rules the same scope of coverage as preexisting practice.
C.

Legal Uncertainty Drove Parties to Adopt Ad Hoc Solutions

The regulation of January 17, 1873 attempted to establish a more
complete set of rules for the creation and enforcement of mortgage claims.
This instrument was initially drafted in the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”),
with input from the Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”) before promulgation.55 The
remedial provisions introduced by the MOJ reveal differing policy
preferences within government.56 The regulation defined two separate forms
of security in land, both created by endorsement of the title deed: a land
pledge in which the lender entered into possession (shichiire), and a land
charge in which he did not (kakiire). 57 For interests created after the
watershed date of February 15, 1872, the remedy for default in both land
pledge and land charge agreements was specified, following the MOJ
position, to be a public sale, with the residue to be returned to the debtor.58
The MOF favored the remedy of direct foreclosure, although it lost
the policy debate in the short term. This differing stance of the two
institutions appears to have been driven by their respective levels of
exposure to and sympathy for foreign law. The MOJ was in the process of
studying the French Civil Code.59 The view at the MOJ was that direct
foreclosure, abhorrent to French law, had existed in the previous era solely

51

See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 215; Ōmi Kōji,
supra note 44, at 163.
52
See Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38, at 3-4.
53
Id.
54
See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 165.
55
See id. at 164-65; Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at
216-24.
56
See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 216-24.
57
See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 165-66, 171-72; Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early
Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 215.
58
See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 164-66.
59
See Fujiwara Akihisa, Mortgage Law in the Early Meiji Period, supra note 31, at 233-34.
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as a means of circumventing the ban on sales of land.60 Accordingly, it was
appropriate under both types of security arrangement to require that the
debtor’s equity in the collateral be respected.61 The MOF sought a closer
adherence to the formalities of prior law and retention of the remedy of
direct foreclosure, but the MOJ position became the governing rule in the
pre-Civil Code period.62
Even after the pronouncement of January 17 and its sister regulations,
officials struggled to apply this newly fashioned secured lending framework
to the varied tapestry of preexisting regional law and local practice.63 In
response to this uncertainty, parties at the local level sought more stable
ways of backing up their promises. A frequently adopted solution was to
create a rough equivalent to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds (i.e. signing
the deed to the land serving as collateral over to the lender), in the
expectation that it be returned upon repayment of the underlying loan. 64
This arrangement had the advantage of a kind of brutal clarity; because the
lender had title to the land, he could enforce his interest by evicting the
borrower, working a forfeiture. Because of its procedural advantages, and
because direct foreclosure had obvious economic attractions to lenders,
mortgages of this form appear to have been common, and the practice
persisted to the promulgation of the January 17 regulation, through the first
steps toward title registration in 1880, and beyond.65
II.

PROCEDURAL CONSTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY DISSUADED
MEIJI COURTS FROM POLICING THE TERMS OF JŌTO TANPO
TRANSACTIONS

Simplicity and certainty of enforcement were important attractions of
“title-transfer security”; 66 although in its simplest form, as a sale coupled
60

See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 165.
See id.
62
See id.
63
See generally Fujiwara Akihisa, Disposition of Security Relationships, supra note 38 (relating in
detail difficulties at the prefectural level in implementing early rules on mortgage transactions).
64
See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 173-77; id. at 187 (citing relevant cases).
65
See id. at 169-71. Registration of real estate was introduced by degrees, beginning with a simple
transaction record at the local level. See Tochi baibai jōto kisoku [Land Sale and Transfer Regulation],
Dajōkan Public Order No. 52 of 1880, § 1; Tōki hō [Registration Act], Law No. 1 of 1886; Tochi daichō
kisoku [Land Register Regulation], Imperial Edict No. 39 of 1889; Fudōsan tōki hō [Real Estate
Registration Act], Law No. 24 of 1899.
66
TSUBAKI TOSHIO, DAIBUTSU BENSAI YOYAKU NO KENKYŪ 314 (1975) (relating a jesting exchange
around the table at a meeting of the Hōsei shingikai [Judicial Reform Committee] that Osaka saw more
cases of jōto tanpo than Tokyo because “persons of bad character”—persons more aggressive about
collections—were more plentiful in the Kansai area; and also indicating the obligation of registry officials
61
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with a conditional reconveyance, such a transaction exposes the debtor to a
risk of loss disproportionate to the value of the underlying loan. For
transactions entered into before the promulgation of the Civil Code, courts
routinely invalidated such sales for failing to comply with the formalities
required to form a security interest. 67 The complete invalidation of one
party’s interest in an intended security arrangement is a fairly drastic
instrument of judicial discipline. A hint of its likely cause may be gleaned
from the respective histories of Japanese and English property law.
A.

The English Mortgage Also Began As a Simple Transfer of Bare Title
By Way of Security

In American legal discourse today, the term “forfeiture” embodies two
distinct concepts: 1) a (relatively) expeditious enforcement procedure; and
2) a creditor’s right to seize collateral of greater value than the outstanding
obligation. 68 Their conflation reflects the fact that the English law of
mortgage, as originally fashioned in the seventeenth century, operated—like
jōto tanpo—by manipulating the core concept of title itself.69 In common
law jurisdictions, the extended foreclosure proceeding, which recognizes a
lingering equity of redemption beyond the compulsory disposition of the
debtor’s paper title, is the procedural means of assuring that conclusive title
cannot move without giving the debtor an opportunity to salvage his
remaining interest in the collateral. Although this ultimate objective is
straightforward,70 treating title itself as the foundation of the secured claim
has forced common law legal doctrine through some severe contortions. As
Sir Frederick Pollock wrote in 1883:
The power and practice of making a debtor’s property, and
especially immovable property, a security to the creditor for the
payment of his debt, are well-nigh as old as the legal
recognition and enforcement of any rights of property
to accept applications for transfers of ownership based on valid documentation, whatever the intention of
the parties might be).
67
See, e.g., Abe v. Memezawa, 7 DAIHAN MINROKU 65 (Issue 11) (Grand Ct. Jud., Dec. 20, 1901);
Shime v. Hayada, 12 DAIHAN MINROKU 1232 (Grand Ct. Jud., Oct. 10, 1906); Takejima v. Takejima, 17
DAIHAN MINROKU 205 (Grand Ct. Jud., Apr. 11, 1911); Sakuma v. Saitō, 17 DAIHAN MINROKU 221 (Grand
Ct. Jud., Apr. 15, 1911).
68
See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 17, at 1113; Marshall Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit:
Explaining the Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REV. 599, 606 (1999). In this Article, the term
“forfeiture” is used in the latter sense, unless otherwise indicated.
69
POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 133-34.
70
Thornborough v. Baker (1675) 3 Swanst. 628, 630, cited in W. HOLDSWORTH, 6 A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 663 (1924) (“In natural justice and equity the principal right of the mortgagee is to the
money, and his right to the land is only as a security for the money,” per Lord Nottingham).
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whatever . . . . The forms, however, in which English law has
given effect to this all but universal practice have been
singularly ill chosen.71
Built on civil law foundations, Japanese law was initially well
positioned to avoid such difficulties. In the earliest appellate judgments of
the Great Court of Judicature72 involving pre-Code transactions, the Court
repeatedly struck down “title-transfer security” agreements as based on a
misrepresentation of intent on the register. 73 This position changed
dramatically when the Court came to consider transactions governed by the
Civil Code, resulting in a doctrinal cocktail that can fairly be described as
novel, both from a comparative perspective and for Japan at that time.
B.

Drafters of the Civil Code Favored Recognition of Agreements for
Abandonment of the Debtor’s Equity upon Default

In contrast to English law, and in keeping with its civil law
foundations, the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 provided a single, specialpurpose security interest for real estate: the hypothec.74 This interest is a
simple registered lien which entitles the secured party to initiate a judicial
auction of the target property upon default, and to satisfy its claim out of the
proceeds of sale.75 Technically, the creditor’s remedy is not limited to this
procedure. In contrast to the French-influenced rules of Japan’s first
generation property system, 76 and following the contemporary fashion for
laissez-faire economics and freedom of contract,77 the Code also permitted
parties to agree that the debtor’s entire interest should be forfeited upon
71

POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 132-33.
Established in 1875, the Daishin’in became the highest national court of appellate jurisdiction
upon the establishment of the unified national judiciary in 1890. Ministry of Justice, Public Order No. 4 of
1875; Saibansho kōsei hō [Courts Establishment Act], Law No. 6 of 1890.
73
See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 187.
74
See MINPŌ arts. 369-98 (1898). Note that the term translated here as “hypothec” (teitōken) has
been rendered in various forms in English translations of Japanese laws over the years. Naming
conventions aside, the author hopes to gain the reader’s indulgence with the observation that “hypothec”
here refers to a registered claim that permits its holder, following appropriate attachment proceedings, to a
priority share in the proceeds of a judicial auction.
75
See MINPŌ arts. 369, 387.
76
See Takayanagi Kenzō, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961,
in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 15, 27-28 (Arthur Taylor von Mehren ed.,
1963).
77
See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776). An abridged translation of The Wealth of Nations was published as early as 1881. The full work
became available in Japanese between 1883 and 1888. Cf. ADAM SMITH, HŌKOKU FUKOKURON [THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS] (Kurashin-mura, Shizuoka Prefecture, Okada Ryōichirō trans., 1881); ADAM SMITH,
HŌKOKU FUKOKURON [THE WEALTH OF NATIONS] (Keizaizasshisha, Tokyo, Ishikawa Eisaku et al. trans.,
1883-88).
72
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default. 78 There was (and is) a single catch: such a contract is not
registrable and, as a result, cannot be set up against attachment creditors and
other third parties.79 This practical restriction on forfeiture clauses would
soon be subjected to collateral attack, via the interest that is the subject of
this Article.
While the Civil Code was under consideration in the National Diet,
the desirability of allowing forfeiture clauses in pledge transactions (where
the creditor takes physical possession of the collateral) was called into
question. Legislators inserted a provision at Section 349 restricting the
claim of a pledge holder (such a pawnbroker) to the amount due on the
underlying obligation.80 In commentaries published after promulgation of
the Code, two of the Civil Code drafters attacked this amendment,
characterizing it as a “wasteful measure” restraining freedom of contract.81
Raising the specter of tight credit and economic stagnation, the drafters
forcefully argued that, in any case, a “title-transfer security” agreement
differed from a pledge, and so should not be held subject to this restriction,
whatever the target collateral might be.82
This introduction of “title-transfer security” as a gloss on the Civil
Code opened a path to contracts for forfeiture, despite the absence of
corresponding enforcement procedures tailored to the needs of such a
lending transaction. As will become clear in the discussion below, this
procedural shortcoming gave rise to difficulties, as courts attempted to refine
their disposition of secured claims over the course of time. In fact, very
similar problems were confronted by the English courts as early as the late
seventeenth century.83 The classic English foreclosure proceeding is a useful
point of comparison to highlight the issues raised by “title-transfer security”
under the Japanese Civil Code.

78

See, e.g., Hashimoto v. Saitō, 14 DAIHAN MINROKU 313 (Grand Ct. Jud, Mar. 20, 1908) (holding
that, under the Civil Code, a hypothec may provide for forfeiture of the collateral in the event of default);
see also Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 180, 184 n.8.
79
See MINPŌ art. 369 (stating that a hypothec is a non-possessory means of security for a specific
debt owed); Fudōsan tōki hō [Real Estate Registration Act], Law No. 24 of 1899, arts. 1, 117 (listing
registrable interests and the registrable elements of a hypothec, respectively).
80
See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 179-80, 187-89.
81
See UME KENJIRŌ, MINPŌ YŌGI SONO NI BUKKEN HEN [ESSENTIAL CIVIL CODE, PART 2: RIGHTS IN
REM] 404-08 (1896); TOMII MASAAKI, MINPŌ GENRON DAI NI KAN BUKKEN [PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL
CODE, VOL. 2: RIGHTS IN REM] 483-85 (1914).
82
Id.
83
See POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 132-35.
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A Judicial Foreclosure Proceeding Opens an Opportunity to Impose
Mandatory Rules On an Otherwise Purely Contractual Relationship

By the nineteenth century, a typical English mortgage was drafted as a
transfer of the borrower’s ownership interest to the lender, conditioned on
the repayment of the loan within a very short period.84 When (as expected)
the borrower did not repay on the date specified (the “law day”), the lender
acquired a legal right to eject the borrower and enter into immediate
possession.85 He was restrained from doing so, however, by severe duties to
care for the property and account to the debtor, and by the debtor’s “equity
of redemption,” under which he could reclaim the property from the lender
by paying the sums due under the loan.86 Critically, the debtor’s right of
redemption could not be defeated by selling the property to a third party.87 A
procedure was available for foreclosing the debtor’s interest, but this was
purposefully structured to be time-consuming, expensive, and uncertain.88
Because the English mortgage was essentially a special form of
contract, it was open to lenders to attempt evasion of procedural barriers to
forfeiture through creative drafting. Courts responded by declaring that
“clogs and fetters” on the equity of redemption were not to be tolerated.89
Under the maxim “once a mortgage, always a mortgage,” the Court of
Chancery came to apply the above procedures to any agreement that
functioned as security for debt, regardless of its form. 90 To avoid the
bilateral monopoly into which this tangled web of legal restrictions would
otherwise force them, lenders developed the practice of including in their
contracts a provision for sale of the property on default, satisfaction of the
debt out of the proceeds, and restoration of the residue to the debtor. 91
Lenders were induced to be chary of the debtor’s interest because the law
had made it procedurally costly to do otherwise.

84
Id. at 134 (“The terms of the transaction were—as they still appear to be—that the debtor must pay
his money to get back the land . . . at a stated time, generally six months after the date of the agreement, or
it would become the creditor’s absolute property.”).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 134-35.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 135.
89
See, e.g., Howard v. Harris, (1683) Eng. Rep. 609, [1558-1774] All. E.R. 609 (Lord Keeper’s
Court); Santley v. Wilde, [1895-1899] All. E.R. 1338, 2 Ch. 747 (A.C.) (1899); see also Tracht, supra note
68, at 600.
90
See, e.g., Seton v. Slade, (1802) Eng. Rep. 163, [1775-1802] All. E.R. 163 (Lord Chancellor’s
Court).
91
POLLOCK, supra note 16, at 135.
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Trust Concepts Enabled Meiji Courts to Embrace Contractualism and
Avoid the Need to Evaluate Security Agreements

Such elaborate judicial protections did not exist in the Meiji era’s
youthful property system and, as a result, the procedural landscape under the
Civil Code was slanted in precisely the opposite direction. The Code
provided a standard, registrable security interest in land, as a hypothec, or
teitō-ken.92 The procedure for enforcing such a claim upon default required
a judicially mandated sale of the property, conducted by licensed officers
operating on a contract basis outside the premises of the court.93 The slack
in this added layer of procedure, together with exceptional protections for
certain short-term leases, 94 exposed the sale process to corruption and
obstructive behavior that undermined the value of the security. These risks
could be circumvented through crude eviction proceedings pursuant to “titletransfer security,” with the added benefit of a possible windfall at the
expense of the unfortunate borrower’s general creditors. 95 As a result,
judicial risks notwithstanding, it is not surprising that lenders persisted in
extracting “title-transfer security,” whether as a primary form of collateral or
as a backup to a mainstream hypothec interest.
Returning to the speculative question posed earlier: why, in the preCode period, did the Great Court of Judicature not do what the English
courts had done, and simply impose the same standard procedure on all
agreements, rather than invalidating “title transfer security” transactions
entirely? The reason may lie in the differing procedural contexts within
which the respective court systems confronted this problem. The maxim
“once a mortgage, always a mortgage” emerged in English jurisprudence
long before the eventual introduction of registered title in the twentieth
century.96 Until that time, the entire substance of interests asserted by the
parties was contained in privately drafted documents.97 The Meiji courts
showed themselves to be perfectly capable of imposing judicial readings on

92

See MINPŌ arts. 369-98.
See Frank G. Bennett, Jr., Civil Excecution in Japan: The Legal Economics of Perfect Honesty,
177 HŌSEI RONSHŪ 1, 4-10 (1999) [hereinafter Bennett, Civil Execution] (concerning the history and status
of the current bailiff system in Japan).
94
See generally Frank G. Bennett, Jr., Clash of the Titles: Japan’s Secured Lenders Meet Civil Code
Section 395, 38 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 281 (1991) [hereinafter Bennett, Clash of Titles].
95
Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 170.
96
Seton v. Slade, (1802) Eng. Rep. 163, [1775-1802] All E.R. 163 (Lord Chancellor’s Court) (U.K.);
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 (U.K).
97
See TIM MURPHY, SIMON ROBERTS & TATIANA FLESSAS, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 20304 (4th ed. 2004).
93
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private contracts. 98 However, the decisions on “title-transfer security”
referred to above arose after the introduction of formal title registration in
188699 and, as such, were based on registered transfers of title. To recast
these transactions in an entirely different form would have required
retroactive rectification of statements on the registers. Without authority to
issue such an order, the scope for judicial innovation in the Japanese context
was thus severely compartmentalized, with the result that judges in these
early cases were constrained to declare winners and losers, without
attempting to craft alternative remedies.
Whatever chilling effect early judgments might have had on attempts
at forfeiture in commercial practice, there was a thaw after the promulgation
of the Civil Code. In 1902 and 1906, the Court handed down successive
judgments upholding “title-transfer security”; and the 1906 decision was the
first recorded judgment to involve movable property.100
In later cases, German trust concepts were drawn upon to support this
result with the elegance of theory. 101 Introduced into Japanese academic
discourse by Professor Okamatsu Santarō in an article published in 1902,102
trust concepts from contemporary German legal doctrine attracted gathering
interest until 1911 when, with nearly a single voice, the courts began
referring to “title-transfer security” as a “declaration of trust” (shintaku
kōi).103 Adding an implied trust layer to the analysis permitted a distinction
to be made between “inner relations” (i.e., as between the parties) and “outer
relations” (i.e., vis-á-vis third parties).104 This served as a doctrinal workaround against the lurking objection that such transactions constituted a
“false declaration of intention” (kyogi no ishi hyōji) under Section 94 of the
Civil Code.105 Into the bargain, it gave judges a degree of freedom within
98

See, e.g., Hozumi Tadao, Hōritsu kōi no “kaishaku” no kōzō to kinō (II), 78 HŌGAKU KYŌKAI
27-71 (1961), translated in The Structure and Function of the “Intepretation” of Juristic Acts, Part
II, 5 L. JAPAN 132 (John O. Haley trans., 1972).
99
See Ōmi Kōji, supra note 44, at 169-71; see also Tochi baibai jōto kisoku [Land Sale and
Transfer Regulation], Dajōkan Public Order No. 52 of 1880, sec. 1; Tōki hō [Registration Act], Law No. 1
of 1886; Tochi daichō kisoku [Land Register Regulation], Imperial Edict No. 39 of 1889; Fudōsan tōki hō
[Real Estate Registration Act], Law No. 24 of 1899.
100
See, e.g., Uriwatashi teitō no hōritsu kankei, 91 HŌRITSU SHINBUN 16, 16 (June 16, 1902)
(reporting the case of Andō v. Sano, Grand Ct. Jud. May 24, 1902); Jōno v. Higashi, 12 DAIHAN MINROKU
1172. (Grand Ct. Jud., Oct. 5, 1906).
101
See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 126.
102
Okamatsu Santarō, Shintaku kōi no kōryoku ni kansuru gakusetsu o hihyōsu [Critical Appraisal of
Academic Theory on the Effect of a Declaration of Trust], NAI-GAI RONSŌ, Vol. 1, Nos. 1-4 (1902).
103
See Ōmi Kōji, Jōto tanpo rironshi (1) [History of jōto tanpo Theory, Part 1], 63 WASEDA HŌGAKU
35, 45 (1987) (Issue 1).
104
See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 128, 136-37.
105
MINPŌ art. 94. Article 94 provides as follows: (1) A false declaration of intention made to the
other party is ineffective . . . (2) The ineffectiveness of a declaration of intention, as referred to in the
ZASSHI
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the “inner relations” zone to discipline overreaching by the lender in preCode contracts, to which restrictions on forfeiture still arguably applied.106
With this doctrinal framework in place, “title-transfer security” became
recognizable in its modern form, which we may henceforth refer to by its
proper name of jōto tanpo.107
In the course of the century that separates the present day from the
early jōto tanpo decisions, the initial thin trust framework has been
superseded by numerous theories attempting to clarify and regulate this
device. 108 For better or for worse, however, the essentials remain
unchanged. The law governing these transactions continues to subsist as a
judicial construct beyond the four corners of the Civil Code; the risk of
forfeiture has been reduced but not eliminated; and jōto tanpo continues to
be thought of and explained in trust-like terms—thereby separating this field
of judge-made law from a Civil Code that would reject it entire, as based on
a false declaration of intention.109
E.

Enforcement of Mainstream Security Interests Was Problematic
through Most of Japan’s Period of High Growth

The value of security naturally depends on the ease and certainty with
which it can be realized by the creditor110 and, as noted above, one of the
important initial incentives for using jōto tanpo against real property was the
relative ease with which it could be enforced. The civil execution
procedures that Japan carried into the period of rapid growth in the 1960s
and 1970s had a number of flaws111 that affected both lender strategies and
the development of case law,112 including the law of jōto tanpo. A review of
policy-driven changes made to the law since that time helps reveal the depth
of the problems, and why jōto tanpo and other non-Code interests were
pursued vigorously in business circles during that period.
subsection above, cannot be asserted against a third party. Id. (author’s translation); see also TADAKA
HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 122-24,126-27, 154-55.
106
Abe v. Memezawa, 7 DAIHAN MINROKU 65 (Issue 11) (Grand Ct. Jud., Dec. 20, 1901); Shime v.
Hayada, 12 DAIHAN MINROKU 1232 (Grand Ct. Jud., Oct. 10, 1906); Takejima v. Takejima, 17 DAIHAN
MINROKU 205 (Grand Ct. Jud., Apr. 11, 1911); Sakuma v. Saitō, 17 DAIHAN MINROKU 221 (Grand Ct. Jud.,
Apr. 15, 1911).
107
SHIN HŌRITSUGAKU JITEN [NEW LEGAL DICTIONARY] 733 (3d ed. 1989).
108
TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 120-60.
109
Id.; MINPŌ art. 94.
110
Kondo Takao, Keibai fudōsan no baikyakuritsu ni tsuite [Concerning the Rate of Successful Sales
in Real Estate Auctions], 38 JIYŪ TO SEIGI 77, 77 (Issue 13) (1987).
111
See Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note 94, at 295; Bennett, Civil Execution, supra note 93, at 1827.
112
Haley, supra note 5, at 137-38.
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To begin with, then as now, the only compulsory remedy available
under a standard Civil Code hypothec was a judicial sale, managed by a
licensed bailiff.113 Originally, most such sales were conducted as face-toface auctions, and until 1966, baliffs operated from their own offices,
separate from the court. This situation fostered collusion between bidders
and the corruption of auction officials, reducing the value of the hypothec
interest.114 In 1966, a reform measure raised the qualifications for newly
appointed bailiffs, elevated their status by making them public officers, and
placed them inside the premises of the court, thus providing for closer
supervision.115
There were further opportunities for entrepreneurial obstructionism,
however. The holder of a hypothec has a priority lien in the collateral, but
does not have a right to vacant possession of the property; in principle, any
action for eviction must be carried out by the purchaser. 116 In Japan,
buildings and land are treated as separate items of property. 117 A latecoming lender can conspire with the debtor to exploit this awkward
fragmentation of ownership, by permitting the lender to construct a minimal
structure on hypothecated land, in exchange for a final desperate advance.118
Because the building is a discrete, registrable item of immovable property,
this introduces an additional layer of issues that must be addressed in
litigation. 119 Taken together, these two factors (sale with occupants in
113

See supra Part II(B).
SHIKKŌRI SEIDO KAIZEN IN KANSURU IKENSHŪ 85 (Ministry of Justice 1955) (response of Meiji
University Faculty of Law, referring to the impact of “unsavoury individuals” on the civil execution
process); SHIHŌ KENSHŪJŌ [LEGAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE], CHŌSA SŌSHO [INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT SERIES] NO. 7, SHIKKŌ HŌ NI KANSURU SHOMONDAI [ISSUES IN THE LAW OF CIVIL EXECUTION]
319-22 (1961) (discussing the merits and demerits of clearance prices as a means of obtaining better results
from judicial auctions, and making the point that “when ordinary bidders freely participate in an auction,
and it emerges that no bids have been made, this indicates that the auction property is not attractive to
bidders at the stated clearance price, and it is sufficient to set a new auction date and to lower the price.
But when the auction proceedings are controlled by one segment of ‘brokers’ who are intentionally
obstructing their progress, and a new auction is inappropriately forced due to a lack of bids, adopting the
normal practice of lowering the auction price will only result in delay of the auction proceedings and
artificially depress the auction price.”); see generally Bennett, Civil Execution, supra note 93 (providing an
account of the background to the 1966 reform of the bailiff system).
115
See Bennett, Civil Execution, supra note 93. In a related reform, in 1979, the Civil Execution Act
was amended to promote auction by sealed bids submitted by post. See Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note
94, at 295; Minji shikkō hō [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 64.
116
See Binyū v. Kokumin kin’yū kōko, 53 MINSHŪ 1899 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Nov. 24, 1999).
117
See Frank G. Bennett, Jr., Building Ownership in Modern Japanese Law: Origins of the Immobile
Home, 26 L. JAPAN 75, 75 (2000) [hereinafter Bennett, Building Ownership].
118
See, e.g., Ōsenchikku K.K. v. Goyō kensetsu K.K., 59 MINSHŪ 356 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench,
Mar. 10, 2005).
119
See, e.g., MINPŌ arts. 388 & 389 (providing for the disposition of an unencumbered building
standing on hypothecated land subjected to auction proceedings, where the building was constructed before
and after the attachment of the hypothec respectively); Tōyō bussan K.K. v. Fukutoku Ginkō K.K., 48
114
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possession and the separate ownership of buildings) can give rise to adverse
selection problems (because of the possibility that such a claim might exist),
depressing the purchase price of all properties.120 A 1979 reform sought to
limit the damage caused by this and other forms of guerrilla security by
providing the result of an onsite bailiff’s inspection to bidders.121
Another difficulty arose from the special treatment of certain leases.
Until 2003, Civil Code section 395 gave short-term leasees a super-priority
over pre-existing hypothecs.122 This legal toehold could be used by a latecoming lender to stall proceedings for the realization of collateral, with a
view to negotiating a settlement with the first-priority secured party. 123
Obstructive leases of this kind, in contrast to ordinary leases for occupation,
were invariably registered against the land or building to which they
applied. 124 Registration of a lease requires the specific consent of the
property owner,125 and a solvent property owner bargaining at arm’s length
will not ordinarily permit registration.126 When a lease is used to obstruct
the realization of collateral, however, the owner has no real stake in the
property, and registration provides documentary proof to the lessee in his
MINSHŪ 1005 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, May 12, 1994) (concerning an eviction proceeding against an
illegal structure standing on hypothecated land). The impact of the separate settlement of land and building
ownership interests extends beyond the field of secured claims. See, e.g., Risai toshi shakuchi shakuya rinji
shori hō [Land Lease and Building Lease Urban Disaster Interim Response Act], Law No. 13 of 1946
(including the establishment of special framework procedures to encourage and support bargaining between
landowners and the owners of buildings destroyed by natural disasters and other causes of mass
destruction). This feature of the Japanese property system may be characterized as an “anti-commons” as
defined in Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
120
See generally George Ackerloff, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (providing an account of adverse selection behavior in markets
characterized by asymmetric information).
121
Minji shikkō hō [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 1979, art. 57; see Bennett, Clash of Titles,
supra note 94, at 295, 301-04.
122
MINPŌ arts. 395, 602, as revised by Tanpo bukken oyobi minji shikkō seido no kaizen no tame no
minpōtō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act to Partially Amend the Civil Code and Other Laws for the
Purpose of Improving Secured Claims and Civil Enforcement], Law No. 156 of 2003, art. 1 [hereinafter
Civil Code Leases Revision] (before amendment, leases of up to 3 years with respect to a building, and 5
years with respect to land, were protected against a subsequently registered hypothec for the remaining
term of the lease).
123
See Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note 94, at 288-92.
124
Watahiki Mariko, “Keibaiya”, “sen’yūya”, taiji wa seikō shita ka? [Has the Extermination of the
“Auction Racketeer” and “Occupation Racketeer” Pests Been Successful?], 927 JURISUTO 64, 64-65
(1989).
125
Nakao v. Shioda, 27 DAIHAN MINROKU 1378 (Grand Ct. Jud., July 11, 1921).
126
Note that land lease interests are an exceptional case, because they are logically necessary to
support the separate ownership of buildings, a peculiar feature of the Japanese property system. See infra
notes 119-120 and accompanying text; see generally Bennett, Building Ownership, supra note 117
(providing an account of the historical development of separate ownership of buildings under Japanese law
and of the role played by leases in that context).
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challenge to the rights of the secured party.127 Registered Section 395 leases
have been used as a legal strategy for obstructing the realization of collateral
since the inception of the Civil Code.128
Opportunistic use of short-term leases became a significant issue for
the finance community during Japan’s recent period of rapid growth.129 But
embedded as this protection was in the property provisions of the Civil
Code, it took several decades for the courts to formulate a telling remedial
response to the Section 395 super-priority.130 It was finally abolished by
statute, in a revision to the Civil Code passed in 2003.131
The availability of numerous ex post strategies for the frustration of
enforcement efforts, particularly in the period before the Civil Execution Act
of 1979, had a substantial impact on the value of collateral under a Civil
Code hypothec. 132 During the period of rapid economic growth, this
prompted transactional innovation by lenders seeking more reliable forms of
security (a development reflected in contemporary scholarship). 133 These
efforts were met with judicial and legislative responses aimed at stabilizing
the commercial environment, by curbing creditor opportunism—specifically
contractual forfeiture—in the real estate sector. 134 But the first type of
transaction to go through this cycle of innovation and reform, discussed
below, was driven by frustration over the terms of the Civil Code property
rules themselves, quite apart from difficulties in enforcement.

127
128

Watahiki Mariko, supra note 124, at 64.
See UCHIDA TAKESHI, TEITŌKEN TO RIYŌKEN [HYPOTHECS

AND THE

RIGHT

OF

USE] 108-10

(1983).
129

See generally Bennett, Clash of Titles, supra note 94 (providing an account of the abusive use of
Section 395, and of judicial and legislative efforts to control it). Cf. UCHIDA TAKESHI, supra note 128
(providing Uchida Takeshi’s published doctoral thesis).
130
Binyū v. Kokumin kin’yū kōko, 53 MINSHŪ 1899 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Nov. 24, 1999) (in a
case of illegal occupation under an invalid lease, holding that a hypothecated lender may sue in his own
name and interest, in advance of judicial sale, for the eviction of persons who are in occupation for the
purpose of obstructing the realization of security).
131
Civil Code Leases Revision, supra note 122, art. 1.
132
See Watahiki Mariko, supra note 124.
133
See, e.g., TSUBAKI TOSHIO, supra note 66; YONEKURA AKIRA, JŌTO TANPO NO KENKYŪ [A STUDY
OF JŌTO TANPO] (1976); YONEKURA AKIRA, JŌTO TANPO (1978); YOSHIDA MASAMI, JŌTO TANPO (1979).
134
See Takuchi tatemono torihikigyō hō [Real Estate Brokerage Act], Law No. 176 of 1952, art.
43(2) (prohibiting licensed real estate brokers from taking ownership as security where more than 30% of
the purchase price has been paid).
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INNOVATIVE REVOLVING CREDIT TRANSACTIONS CHALLENGED THE
DEBTOR’S EQUITY BY AVOIDING MAINSTREAM ENFORCEMENT
PROCEDURES FOR SECURED CLAIMS

As originally drafted, the Civil Code provides a single non-possessory
security interest applicable to real estate, in the form of the hypothec,
defined in Sections 369 through 398.135 This interest is intended to support a
single advance of funds and cover the principle outstanding plus a maximum
of two years’ accrued interest; it cannot be used to cover future advances to
the debtor. 136 Accordingly, the hypothec is unsuitable for backing a
revolving credit arrangement, in which the creditor makes periodic advances
to the borrower under a series of promissory notes. To fill this common
need, the commercial community resorted to a complex transaction, the
name of which translates literally as provisional registration of a
“preliminary contract for substitute performance subject to a suspensive
condition.”137 As this name may suggest to those trained in the common
law, it is an attempt to fashion something resembling a defeasible fee, using
the Japanese property registers and contract provisions of the Civil Code as
raw materials. 138 Because of this similarity in conceptual structure, this
interest will be referred to in the discussion below as a “mortgage by
registration.”
The mechanics of a typical transaction of this kind operated roughly
as follows. In support of the loan agreement, the debtor put his seal to a
contract for the conveyance of real estate to the creditor, with a provision
that the conveyance would become final upon the failure of the debtor to pay
sums due to the creditor. Together with other documents required to
complete a transfer of ownership, this contract of conveyance was used as
the basis for a “provisional registration” (kari tōki) on the property register.
The debtor retained ownership of the property, but the creditor’s claim was
now protected against subsequent interests that might attach to it. In the
event of default, the creditor filed suit to establish the fact of nonpayment
and obtained an attachment order, which he could then use to convert the
“provisional registration” to a final registration, establishing full
ownership.139
135

MINPŌ arts. 369-398.
MINPŌ arts. 369, 375; see COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT, supra note 28.
137
Haley, supra note 5, at 133 (providing translation).
138
See generally Haley, supra note 5 (providing an account of the preliminary contract for substitute
performance subject to a suspensive condition).
139
For a detailed description of the mechanics of the transaction, see id. at 138-39. For the specific
registration requirements, see SHIHŌ-SHOSHI SETSUREI & ZUKAISHIKI “MIRUDAKE” FUDŌSAN TŌKI
136
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Like the jōto tanpo, the terms of a mortgage by registration were fixed
by the contract between the parties and could thus be extended to cover
multiple obligations arising over time, including notes acquired from other
creditors.140 Recognition of these arrangements in the courts brought about a
surge in their use.141 While this filled the immediate need for a means of
securing revolving lines of credit, the structure of the mortgage by
registration positively encouraged creditor overreaching.
Because it took the form of a contract of sale, a mortgage by
registration did not provide a means of stating the value to be secured on the
register. 142 While the parties could in theory negotiate a formula for
calculating the extent of the creditor’s claim (an anti-forfeiture clause)
between themselves, in practice there was little incentive for them to do so.
Negotiation over mortgage terms is premised on the risk of insolvency.
Other potential lenders would normally assume that a mortgage by
registration had no ceiling and contained no anti-forfeiture clause, because
there was no systematic means of disclosing either. 143 An anti-forfeiture
clause (or even a ceiling on the extent of the security) would therefore have
no value to the borrower as a means of reserving equity in the property to
support advances by other lenders. The sole benefit to the borrower of any
such limitation (in this specific case of mortgages by registration) would be
its value to himself in the event of his own insolvency—which would of
course be zero, since the borrower would expect any remaining equity to be
seized by attachment creditors in that event.
Accordingly, borrowers beyond a certain risk threshold willingly
signed on to revolving credit agreements that did not provide protection
against forfeiture, and in a large number of transactions seen by the courts,
the value of the collateral upon default significantly exceeded the amount
owing to the secured creditor (i.e. the mortgagee by registration). 144 In
response, the courts adopted a policy of denying enforcement of the
SHOSHIKI-SHŪ (GE) [CONVEYANCING AGENT PRECEDENTS AND ILLUSTRATIONS “AT A GLANCE”,
ESTATE REGISTRATION FORMS (PART 2)] 440-442 (2007) [hereinafter CONVEYANCING FORMS].

REAL

140
Suzuki Rokuya, Karitōki tanpo hō zakkō [Reflections on the Mortgage by Registration], 880
KIN’YŪ HŌMU JIJŌ 29 (1979) (discussing the viability of rotating credit security arrangements cast as
mortgages by registration following the passage of the Mortgages Act 1978).
141
TSUBAKI TOSHIO, supra note 66, at 326 (indicating that 22 cases involving mortgages by
registration were decided by the courts between the first judgment characterizing the arrangement as a
security interest, and the most recent data available to the author of the work at the time of writing, in
1973—including 4 further decisions by the Supreme Court).
142
For sample register entries, see CONVEYANCING FORMS, supra note 139.
143
See generally Ackerloff, supra note 120 (providing an account of adverse selection behavior in
markets characterized by asymmetric information).
144
See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 163-64.
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creditor’s interest where the disparity between the debt owed and the value
of the collateral was extreme, on the grounds of “public order and morality”
(kō no chitsujo mata wa zenryo no fūzoku).145
A.

Legislation Sought to Impose Mainstream Enforcement Procedures on
Revolving Credit Arrangements

In an attempt to address these issues, the Diet intervened, adding an
entire subsection to the Civil Code with specific provisions covering a new
“root hypothec” interest. 146 This registrable interest provides umbrella
security for miscellaneous obligations, including promissory notes and other
rights to payment acquired by assignment, up to the point of an act of
bankruptcy.147 To permit the borrower to signal the extent of the security to
third parties, the maximum amount to be covered is specified at the time of
registration.148 At the back end, the root hypothec interest relies on the same
procedures for judicial auction and distribution of proceeds as the standard
Civil Code hypothec.149
This carefully crafted reform was enacted by the Diet in 1971,150 but it
did not achieve the degree of adoption hoped for by its drafters; many
businesses continued to use the mortgage by registration that the root
hypothec was intended to replace.151 One reason for this was then-existing
obstacles to the realization of hypothec claims. 152 Despite the risk of
forfeiture, and apart from its utility in securing future advances, the
mortgage by registration had significant advantages for borrowers.
Compared with the standard Civil Code hypothec, it allowed borrowers to
make a credible commitment not to obstruct collection efforts in the event of
default; and as compared with jōto tanpo, it exposed the borrower to less
risk during the term of the loan, because he retained legal title to the
collateral until the instant of enforcement. However, the forfeiture and
145

MINPŌ art. 90. Article 90 provides as follows: Legal acts for purposes that conflict with public
order and morality are void. Id. (author’s translation); see also TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 16364.
146
Minpō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act to Partially Revise the Civil Code], Law No. 99 of
1971.
147
MINPŌ art. 398-2.
148
Id. art 398-2, para. 1.
149
See MINPŌ arts. 369, 398-2; Minji shikkō hō [Civil Execution Act], Law No. 4 of 1979, arts. 4392, 181.
150
Minpō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Act to Partially Revise the Civil Code], Law No. 99 of
1971.
151
See Suzuki Rokuya, supra note 140, at 30.
152
See Haley, supra note 5, at 138-39 (providing a contemporary description of obstacles to the
realization of hypothecated collateral).
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signaling problems were also inherent to its structure, and these were
naturally unaffected by the 1971 legislation.153
B.

Opportunism Persisted, and Courts Strove to Protect the Debtor’s
Equity Through Ground-Breaking Precedent

In an effort to address the most glaring result of bargaining failure (i.e.
mismatches between the value of collateral and the sums owed to the
creditor), in 1967 the Supreme Court signaled approval of lower court
efforts to restrict the forfeiture remedy, 154 leading to a later definitive
judgment of the Grand Bench, handed down on October 23, 1974.155 The
1974 decision outlined two alternative remedial tracks: execution by sale
and direct execution. In execution by sale, the borrower’s right to redeem
would be extinguished by sale to a third party, but he would then have
recourse to the lender for a share of the proceeds.156 In direct execution, the
borrower could withhold his consent to conversion on the register until the
creditor offered up a reasonable accounting of the borrower’s equity.157 In
the latter case only, the debtor’s right to recover his property was, as in
English law, protected up to the instant of foreclosure by treating the
accounting and the transfer of ownership as reciprocal, or “simultaneous,”
obligations.158
C.

Non-Code Revolving Credit Arrangements Were Eliminated By Statute
by Imposing a Special Judicial Foreclosure Proceeding

The Supreme Court decision of 1967 established the borrower’s right
to an accounting. The Diet subsequently adopted and extended this judicial
framework, with the passage of the Act Concerning Provisional Registration

153

In effect, the new legislation forced parties to choose one advantage (a bargained-for limitation on
the extent of security) but abandon another (reliable enforcement procedures).
154
Decision of the Supreme Court, 21 MINSHŪ 2430, (First Petty Bench, Nov. 16, 1967). The early
phase of this series of cases was the subject of an article published by Professor Haley in 1972. Haley,
supra note 5 (providing an account of contemporary case law concerning the “preliminary contract for
substitute performance subject to a suspensive condition”, or “mortgage by registration”, as it is referred to
in the main text of this Article).
155
Mikami v. Kobayashi, 28 MINSHŪ 1473 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Oct. 23, 1974).
156
Id. at 1482.
157
Id.
158
Haley describes public auction as the favoured means of disposition. Haley, supra note 5, at 14546. While this was the case in 1972, the courts later concluded that direct foreclosure provided them with a
better capacity to assure a fair accounting of the debtor’s interest. See TAKAGI ET AL., MINPŌ KŌZA 3:
TANPO BUKKEN [COURSE IN THE CIVIL CODE, VOLUME 3, SECURITY INTERESTS] 295-96 (revised ed. 1980).
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Security Contracts in 1978 (“Mortgages Act 1978”).159 To assure that the
borrower’s equity in the collateral is protected, the Act requires the lender to
notify the debtor of his intention to foreclose, together with a statement of
the proposed accounting, two months before converting his provisional
registration of ownership to a main registration entry. 160 The right to
foreclosure arises two months after this notice, 161 thereby providing the
debtor with an opportunity to object and open negotiations if the proposed
accounting amount is unacceptable. The Act also introduces an explicit
requirement that the mortgagee obtain the consent of holders of subordinate
interests, if any, as a precondition of asserting a right to title.162 Without
such consent, the mortgagee’s remedy is limited to a judicial auction and
accounting.
The Mortgages Act 1978 has virtually eliminated mortgages by
registration from the transactional universe, largely because the legislation,
in a parting shot at a recalcitrant industry, specifically excludes revolving
credit arrangements from the scope of perfection. 163 Encumbered with
additional procedural requirements, with significantly reduced flexibility,
and stripped of the possibility of forfeiture, mortgage by registration lost its
lustre. Lenders turned either to one of the forms of hypothec defined in the
Civil Code or to jōto tanpo, which was not affected by the restrictions
imposed by this legislation.
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE DEBTOR’S EQUITY IN JŌTO TANPO
TRANSACTION REMAINS PROBLEMATIC

IV.

The jōto tanpo against real property is the oldest of Japan’s non-Code
security interests. It offers a simplified means of enforcing security, through
a direct claim to title in the collateral. It must be said that the scope for its
use is narrower today than it once was. As discussed above,164 since the
introduction of the root hypothec, it has been possible to support revolving
credit arrangements without resorting to non-Code security interests; and
improvements to judicial auction procedures have increased the utility of the
mainstream interests. The Civil Code interests offer greater flexibility;
159

Kari-tōki tanpo keiyakutō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Provisional Registration Security
Contracts], Law No. 78 of 1978 [hereinafter Mortgages Act 1978].
160
Id. art. 2.
161
Proof of the notice and its content can be made by use of “contents proven post”, under which the
Post Office retains a true copy of the correspondence, coupled with certified delivery. See Yūbin hō [Postal
Act], Law No. 165 of 1947, arts. 62 & 63.
162
Mortgages Act 1978, supra note 159, art. 4.
163
Id. art. 14. See COMMENTARIES ON CIVIL CODE PRECEDENT, supra note 28, at 270.
164
See supra Part III.
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because jōto tanpo operates against bare title (as a nominal transfer of
ownership) the property must be free of other liens at the time of creation—a
scenario uncommon among the failing debtors most likely to expose
themselves to the risks associated with jōto tanpo. Nonetheless, insofar as
jōto tanpo remains a recognized security device, is found in commerce, and
continues to generate litigation, it continues to absorb limited judicial
resources, and remains a potential target for further statutory reform.
As noted above, the foundation of security arrangements in common
law jurisdictions originally lay in paper drafted by the parties.165 Bearing in
mind the differing procedural contexts, comparison of holdings relating to
jōto tanpo with judicial experience in common law jurisdictions can help
both to highlight the constraints facing Japanese courts and to raise the
possibility of an alternative approach to these transactions. Below,
following a brief overview of the modern rules relating to jōto tanpo in real
property, this Article will discuss three Supreme Court cases relating,
respectively, to third-party dispositions, mortgagees in possession, and an
analogue to the common law “clogs and fetters” doctrine.166
One procedural point that should be noted at the outset is that the
“equity of redemption” 167 does not exist (or at least has a very different
meaning) in the Japanese context. Properly speaking, the term signifies the
postponement, by the court, of a valid transfer of title made with the
intention of offering it as security. This postponement is imposed by forcing
all transactions that the court deems to constitute security arrangements
(mortgages) through mandatory foreclosure proceedings.168 Courts in Japan
do not have the power to impose a comprehensive procedure in this way. As
in other civil law jurisdictions, the remedies available for a given secured
claim are attached to the specific formal character of the interest at stake. In
the case of attachment or the exercise of a hypothec, collateral is realized by
judicial auction, 169 while in a case of illegal occupation, the owner’s remedy
is an immediate action for eviction.170 For this reason, many of the familiar
equitable pronouncements by common law courts in respect of the equity of

165

See MURPHY, ROBERTS & FLESSAS, supra note 97, at 203-04; see also note 97 and accompanying

text.
166
See, e.g., Howard v. Harris, (1683) Eng. Rep. 609, [1558-1774] All. E.R. 609 (Lord Keeper’s
Court); Santley v. Wilde, [1895-1899] All. E.R. 1338, 2 Ch. 747 (A.C.) (1899); see also Tracht, supra note
68, at 600.
167
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 541 (6th ed. 1990).
168
See, e.g., Stevens v. Theatres Ltd., (1903) 1 Ch. 857 (U.K).
169
Minji shikkō hō arts. 43-92.
170
Id. arts. 168-70.
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redemption have no context in Japan.171 This procedural difference is an
important factor in the use and impact of jōto tanpo and other non-Code
interests within the transactional system.
Under current law, the real property jōto tanpo transaction takes the
same form that it did in 1899. A promise to reconvey the property to the
borrower upon repayment is recited as part of a contract of sale, and this is
used as the basis for registering ownership in the lender.172 The contract of
sale must indicate the “cause of registration” (tōki no gen’in), which must
also be recited in the power of attorney offered by the owner. 173 In an
orthodox transaction negotiated at arm’s length, the cause of registration will
be listed as “jōto tanpo.” 174 The obligation to restore the property upon
repayment is discoverable on the face of the register in this case, but there is
no means of registering the specific terms of the reconveyance undertaking.
The creditor becomes the legal owner, and the collateral is vulnerable both
to third party claims arising from bankruptcy of the lender and to attachment
proceedings against him. 175 Upon default by the borrower, the lender is
legally entitled to realize the collateral, either by claiming it directly or by
selling to a third party.176
Supreme Court decisions handed down in 1968 (foreclosure by sale
contracts) and 1971 (direct foreclosure contracts) have established the wellintentioned principle that the debtor in a jōto tanpo arrangement is entitled to
demand an accounting from the creditor if the collateral is worth more than
the amount in default.177 Depending on one’s favored legal theory, the jōto
tanpo-secured lender might be said to hold title on trust,178 or subject to
171
See, e.g., Batty v Snook, 5 Mich 231, 239-240 (1858) (“The mortgagor may release equity of
redemption to the mortgagee for a good and valuable consideration, when done voluntarily, and there is no
fraud, and no undue influence brought to bear on him for that purpose by the creditor. But it cannot be
done by a contemporaneous or subsequent executory contract, by which the equity of redemption is to be
forfeited if the mortgage debt is not paid on the day stated in the contract, without an abandonment by the
court of those equitable principals it has ever acted on in relieving against penalties and forfeitures.”)
172
See FUDŌSAN TŌKI JITSUMU [REGISTRATION PRACTICE] 389-91 (3d ed., Ministry of Just. Civ. Div.
ed., 1978).
173
See id.
174
There are cases in which the jōto tanpo is not visible on the register. See, e.g., Imai v. Takechi, 48
MINSHŪ 414 (Sup. Ct., Third Petty Bench, Feb. 22, 1994).
175
See, e.g., [name undisclosed] K.K. v. Seiri kaishū kikō K.K., 1225 HANREI TAIMUZU 187 (2007)
(Sup. Ct., Second Petty Bench, Oct. 20, 2006).
176
The permissible means of realizing the collateral may be limited in the contract between the
parties, although this does not affect the secured party’s legal power of disposition.
177
Izumi v. Kanai, 22 MINSHŪ 509 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, 1968); Shinkai v. Takahashi, 25
MINSHŪ 208 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, 1971). The accounting requirement replaced the previous rule,
under which security agreements were voided entirely where the disparity between the value of the
collateral and the debt owed was excessively great.
178
See TADAKA HIROTAKA, supra note 4, at 126-32.
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publicity,179 or as a façade,180 or in common with the debtor,181 or subject to
the debtor’s expectation interest.182 Unfortunately, of course, none of these
elaborate concepts are visible on the register; the secured party is shown
simply as “owner” of the property. If the creditor transfers his interest to a
third party before settling accounts with the debtor, the practical question
arises whether the debtor’s right to redeem can be asserted against a
transferee taking with notice. This is the subject of the following case.
A.

Imai v. Takechi: A Third-Party Purchaser from the Jōto Tanpo
Mortgagee Takes Good Title Regardless of Notice, if the Transfer is
Supported By Registration

The case of Imai v. Takechi183 turns on a tangled and long-burning
family dispute involving siblings and spouses of two sisters Imai. 184 In
1957, Takechi Kazuo, husband to Hanako (née Imai), borrowed 520,000 yen
from Wada Tsuneo, the husband of Hanako’s younger sister.185 The loan was
to be repaid in interest-free monthly installments of 5,000 yen over a period
of eight years and seven months.186 The loan supported the purchase of land
and a house, and Takechi secured his promise to repay by immediately
transferring ownership of the property to Wada, with a reciprocal
undertaking that ownership would be restored upon full repayment.187 This
conveyance was duly registered, with “gift” as the cause of registration.188
For reasons not given in the judgment, in May of 1963, eldest brother Imai
Ken’ichiro and the mother of the Imai clan moved into the property with
Takechi and Hanako.189 The two families did not get along. Takechi moved
out, ceasing payment on the loan from Wada (husband of Hanako’s younger
sister), and leaving some 150,000 yen outstanding on the loan.190
Over a decade later, in 1977, Takechi filed suit seeking the eviction of
Imai Ken’ichiro from the property and restoration of ownership to his own
name.191 The court refused to remove Wada Tsuneo’s ownership from the
179

See id. at 140-41 (citing the work of Ishida Bunjirō).
See id. at 141-42 (citing the work of Hamagami Norio).
181
See id. at 146 (citing the work of Suzuki Rokuya).
182
See id. at 146-47 (citing the work of Takeuchi Toshio).
183
Imai v. Takechi, 48 MINSHŪ 414 (Sup. Ct., Third Petty Bench, Feb. 22, 1994).
184
See id. at 421.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 421-22.
188
Id. at 422.
189
Id. at 423.
190
See id. at 435.
191
Id. at 424.
180
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register, on the grounds that the original loan was still outstanding;
nevertheless, the court acknowledged that Takechi was entitled to the
eviction order as the equitable owner under a jōto tanpo.192 The court issued
the order, removing Imai Ken’ichiro from the premises; Takechi resumed
occupation.193
Two more years passed, and on May 10, 1979, after Imai Ken’ichiro
prevailed upon Wada Tsuneo for assistance against his other brother-in-law,
the latter sent a notice to Takechi, by contents proven post,194 of his intention
to settle accounts and foreclose Takechi’s interest in the property.195 The
letter was returned undelivered, but on August 29, 1979, Wada Tsuneo
proceeded to transfer his ownership interest in the house and land (still
occupied by Takechi) to Imai Ken’ichiro.196 This transaction was entered on
the register as a “gift” two days later.197 No accounting was made to Takechi
following the transfer, but Takechi evidently caught wind of these
machinations: on August 20, 1981, he paid the arrears under the loan (which
with statutory interest had more than doubled to a sum of 383,013 yen) into
court escrow as his redemption payment.198 In response, Imai Ken’ichiro
sued Takechi for eviction on the grounds that, as registered transferee, Imai
Ken’ichiro had acquired ownership of the property free of Takechi’s right of
redemption.199
1.

The Borrower, Not the Lender, is Vulnerable to Third Party Transfers
in a Jōto Tanpo Relationship

As the two acts of registration in this case illustrate, a jōto tanpo
agreement conveys an alienable ownership interest to the lender. It
resembles an equitable mortgage in common law jurisdictions—but with the
“equitable” and “legal” positions reversed. Rather than an equitable right in
the lender that may be vulnerable to third-party claims,200 under jōto tanpo it
is the borrower who holds an uncertain, “equitable” claim for reconveyance.
Modeling the jōto tanpo structure in these terms, the lender would be said to
hold the legal estate in the land on trust for the borrower. Upon disposition
192

Id.
Id. While this lawsuit must obviously have been a cause of considerable stress within the family,
it is not clear whether Takechi’s marriage to Hanako fell apart before or after it was filed.
194
See supra note 161; see also Yūbin hō [Postal Act], Law No. 165 of 1947, arts. 62 & 65.
195
Imai v. Takechi, 48 MINSHŪ 414, 426 (Sup. Ct., Third Petty Bench, Feb. 22, 1994).
196
Id. at 426-27.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 436.
199
Id. at 421-22.
200
See Stevens v. Theatres Ltd., (1903) 1 Ch. 857, 863-64 (U.K.)
193
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by the trustee of the legal estate to a third party, the borrower, as beneficiary,
would be entitled to defeat the third party’s title and exercise his right to
redeem.201 Under equitable principles familiar in common law jurisdictions,
purchasers for value without notice of the trust would be protected, but in
this case, the plaintiff Imai Ken’ichiro took with notice (and was not a
purchaser, to boot).202
2.

Foreclosure Proceedings and the Doctrine of Notice Are
Complementary Instruments of Judicial Discipline

Secured transactions of this precise form are not a feature of the
English conveyancing environment. However, prior to England’s Law of
Property Act 1925, a similar posture could arise in the context of foreclosure
proceedings.203 Stevens v. Theatres, Ltd.204 represents such a case. Classic
foreclosure proceeds in three phases: 1) the lender first petitions the court
for foreclosure unless the borrower pays all sums due by a particular date; 2)
if the borrower fails to pay, the court then issues an order of foreclosure nisi,
which confirms the failure to pay and places the property under the court’s
jurisdiction; and 3) if at the end of this interval (typically six months)
payment is still not forthcoming, the mortgagee may obtain an order of
foreclosure absolute, which in principle entirely severs the interest of the
borrower. As had become common practice by the time of the Stevens
decision, the mortgage in that case gave the mortgagee an explicit,
contractual power of sale.205 The sole issue in the case was whether, in the
administrative interval between foreclosure nisi and foreclosure absolute,206
the mortgagee had authority to sell the property without leave of the court.
The court held that while the mortgagee had the legal power to dispose of
the mortgage, this was subject to an equitable requirement to obtain leave of
the court before sale. 207 The conveyance was permitted to stand, on the
condition that it be shown that the purchaser took without notice of the stillpending foreclosure proceeding.208 Only when that was confirmed would
201

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY & MARTIN: MODERN EQUITY 18 (15th ed. 1997).
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, §§ 101 & 103 (U.K).
204
Stevens v. Theatres Ltd., (1903) 1 Ch. 857 (U.K.).
205
KEVIN GRAY, ELEMENTS OF LAND LAW 629-30 (1987).
206
Both in the original English judicial design, and in the statutory form found in many of the
American states, this interval has been explained as providing a breathing space within which the parties
can attempt to resolve information asymmetries and restructure their commercial relationship. See
generally Tracht, supra note 68.
207
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the purchaser receive good title, and the mortgagor a money claim against
the mortgagee for any surplus.209
3.

The Supreme Court’s Holding: Registration Determines All

If the doctrine of notice used in Stevens were applied to a case like
Imai v. Takechi, the right to redemption enjoyed by the borrower (Takechi)
would be protected against third parties taking with notice of the interest. In
the event, however, the trial court judge ignored Imai’s evident knowledge
of the unregistered security interest, reasoned that the attempted
communication of May 10, 1979 was sufficient to cut off Takechi’s legal
right to the property, and held for Imai. 210 The Takamatsu High Court
applied the doctrine of notice and reversed, ordering that title be settled on
Takechi.211 The Supreme Court again reversed, holding that Takechi’s claim
to the property was conclusively severed when Imai Ken’ichiro took the
transfer from Wada as registered owner, regardless of knowledge.212 This
case firmly establishes that actual notice is irrelevant in a jōto tanpo
transaction; the title of a third-party transferee, if taken in reliance on the
register, is unassailable.
The court gives two reasons for this judgment: “Not only would a
contrary holding destabilize the chain of title, but it would give rise to the
risk that a creditor, who may not be in a position to identify a mala fide
transferee with notice, will suffer an unforeseeable loss.”213 This holding
has been the target of criticism.214 It is indeed difficult to see how limiting
the right of redemption to third-party transferees with actual notice would
unduly destabilize the chain of title, because such transferees can easily
protect themselves by foregoing the purchase. Furthermore, because the
debtor’s challenge to the transfer is premised on the tender of monies due,
the creditor would not be exposed to financial risk. The required
adjustments would, at worst, be an inconvenience to the creditor, but would
also reduce the burden of litigation by eliminating the need for a second
action—such as a suit by Takechi against Wada to recover the value of his
equity in the property.
209

Id. (“That the mortgagee could not exercise his power of sale without the leave of the Court so as
to give a good title to any one other than a purchaser for value without notice. But this is not to preclude the
mortgagee from setting up any other equity he may have in any action brought by the mortgagor.”)
210
Imai v. Takechi, 48 MINSHŪ 414, 420-28 (Sup. Ct., Third Petty Bench, Feb. 22, 1994).
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Id. at 428-40.
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Id. at 414-20.
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Id. at 416 (author’s translation).
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Imai v. Takechi, 48 MINSHŪ at 420-28, reprinted with commentary in 888 HANREI TAIMUZU 114
(1995).
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Protecting Registered Transfers by the Jōto Tanpo Mortgagee
Increases the Risk of Creditor Opportunism

Japan’s limited form of title registration provides a firmer justification
for the rule in this case. In jurisdictions such as Australia (since 1858),215
Japan (since 1899),216 and England (since 1925),217 the equitable niceties of
off-register transactions conflict with the objectives of registered title. 218
The guiding principles of such a system are commonly articulated to be
three: 1) the mirror principle (entries on the register should provide a
complete and correct view of legal interests); 2) the curtain principle
(equitable interests should not affect the title acquired by the purchaser); and
3) the insurance principle (the state guarantees the accuracy of the register
to the purchaser).219
These principles are aimed at lowering the cost of conveyancing, by
allowing buyers to evaluate the title of real estate by simply examining the
register.220 The Japanese registration system has all of these characteristics
except for the third. It is worth noting that the holding in Imai v. Takechi—
that title received from a registered owner is never affected by an off-register
jōto tanpo interest—reduces the demand for insurance by making
transactions safer for the purchaser. It does so, however, only by shifting the
risk to the borrower.
In England, courts have refused to recognize the mortgage by deposit
of title deeds against registered land, on the grounds that to do so would
violate the mirror principle.221 This has effectively eliminated the equitable
mortgage by deposit of title deeds from the registered conveyancing
landscape in England and Wales. 222 In Japan’s jōto tanpo, as indicated
above, the equitable and legal positions or borrower and secured party are
reversed. The result is that the same strict adherence to the register has an
215

Real Property Act, 1858, n. 15 (S. AUSTL. STAT.).
Fudōsan tōki hō [Real Estate Registration Act], Law No. 24 of 1899.
217
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20 §§ 101, 103 (U.K.).
218
See Pamela O’Connor, Registration of Title in England and Australia: A Theoretical and
Comparative Analysis, in 2 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 81, 94-95 (Elizabeth Cooke, ed., 2003).
219
See, e.g., Katy Barnett, The Mirror of Title Crack’d From Side to Side? The Amazing Half-Life of
the Equitable Mortgage, 14 AUSTL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2007).
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recognized under Australian law. See Barnett, supra note 219, at 5-6.
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Jonathan Ross, Solicitor’s Liability to Third Parties, 151 NEW L.J. 960 (2001) (citing Dean v.
Allin & Watts, [2001] All ER (D) 288 (2001) (U.K.)) (defendant law firm that recommended deposit of
title deeds as means of security to an unrepresented lender in a loan transaction were held liable in
negligence for the failure of the security, on the grounds that its ineffectiveness had been widely
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opposite effect in Japan. 223 The unrestricted power of sale sustains jōto
tanpo as a viable non-Code, off-register security device, while the contrary
rule (i.e. applying the doctrine of notice) would have marginally undermined
the transaction, making the realization of collateral under jōto tanpo less
certain.224
Thus, both English and Japanese courts favor strict adherence to a
bright-line rule with respect to “off-register” interests, but with opposite
effect. Due to differing commercial customs in the two jurisdictions, strict
respect for the register in one case eliminates the off-register transaction, but
in the other case it positively encourages it. Unfortunately, this offers
considerable scope for opportunism, as illustrated by the following case.
B.

Nakano v. Okamura: The Mortgages Act 1978 Foreclosure Procedure
is Not To Be Applied to Analogous Transactions

On April 8, 1994, Nakano Kōju took a short-term loan in the amount
of 33,000,000 yen from Okamura Shōhei.225 Their agreement provided for
payment of interest at the rate of 2.5% per month, with a due date of June 7,
1994, plus a penalty of 40.004% per year in the event of late payment.226
The loan was secured by a root hypothec to the amount of 70,000,000 yen
against land owned by Nakano, which Okamura duly registered.227 Nakano
did not meet the contract deadline for repayment, but over time made
payments totaling 4,856,000 yen, the last on January 31, 1995. 228 At a
meeting on May 2, 1995, Nakano implored Okamura not to initiate auction
proceedings based on the hypothec.229 The two settled upon a forbearance
until May 25, and Nakano provided Okamura with documents necessary to
effect a transfer of the property into Okamura’s name on that date, with
leave to sell to third parties, if timely payment was not made.230 Nakano
again defaulted, and on May 26, Okamura registered the conveyance of the
property, giving “substitute performance” as the cause of registration.231

223

See supra Part IV(A)(1).
In effect, the Supreme Court decision in Imai v. Takechi provides the creditor with a certain means
of exiting the bilateral monopoly in which he would otherwise be locked under the security arrangement.
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Nakano v. Okamura, 1106 HANREI TAIMUZU 81, 83 (Jan. 15, 2003) (Sup. Ct. First Petty Bench,
Sep. 12, 2002).
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After completing this transfer of legal ownership, Okamura again
pressed Nakano for repayment of the loan, and on June 8, Okamura notified
Nakano that he was willing to reconvey the property to him if payment were
made by June 16.232 In exchange for this one-week postponement, Nakano
put his seal to a declaration waiving his equity in the property in the event of
further default.233 Nakano defaulted again, but made a partial payment of
10,000,000 yen on September 15, which Okamura accepted.234
On December 24, 1995, Okamura made a final demand: payment of
the total sum due under the loan (41,272,600 yen) by January 26, 1996,
including a stipulation that the property would be immediately sold upon
default.235 Nakano did not respond. On July 19, 1996, Okamura sold the
property to a third party, Sano Nobuichi, who promptly registered his
interest.236 Having lost his property, Nakano sued to avoid both the original
transfer to Okamura and the Okamura-Sano sale and, in the alternative, for
100,000,000 yen as compensation for Nakano’s equitable interest in the
property.237
This case turns on the characterization of the conveyance that
Okamura registered on May 26, 1995. If the stated purpose for the
registration of the transfer of title—“substitute performance”—is accepted,
then the conveyance satisfied Nakano’s obligations under the loan, and
Nakano had at that point surrendered all rights in the property.238 However,
in the case, both parties subsequently behaved as if the loan obligation
continued, and as if Okamura held title only as security. If the NakanoOkamura transfer is treated as a jōto tanpo, the final sale to third party Sano
is final, and Nakano’s only claim should be against Okamura for an
accounting (assuming Nakano’s waiver of his equity to be invalid, as it
appears to be).239
1.

The Mortgagor Sought to Impose Special Foreclosure Proceedings

At trial, neither party characterized the transaction as jōto tanpo.
Okamura relied on the documentation, claiming the original transfer was a

232
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Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
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MINPŌ art. 482. See Haley, supra note 5, at 135.
Izumi v. Kanai, 22 MINSHŪ 509 (Sup. Ct., First Petty Bench, 1968).
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substitute performance for sums due.240 Nakano, for his part, argued that the
documents for the original transfer, which were worded to take effect
twenty-three days from the date of delivery, constituted a mortgage by
registration (although it did not satisfy the formalities for that interest, and
was not so registered).241 On the theory that the Mortgages Act 1978 should
be applied to the transaction, Nakano petitioned to set aside the original
transfer, because Okamura had not given formal notice of an intention to
exercise his interest two months before it was registered as a final transfer,
as required by Section 2 of that Act.242
2.

The Form of a Jōto Tanpo Transaction Invites Ex Post
Characterization of Its Function

The facts of this case illustrate the exotic attraction of jōto tanpo in
real estate as a tool for collections. In the interval between May 25 and
September 15, 1995, the character of the transaction was truly ambiguous.
Had Okamura sold the property during this period, evidence for treating the
sale as a true substitute performance would be strong. The subsequent
tender by Nakano, and its acceptance by Okamura, implies on the contrary
that the agreement is a security arrangement. The potential for the lender in
such an arrangement to play the market at the expense of the debtor is clear.
The appeal to the Mortgages Act 1978 by Nakano’s counsel reflects a
proposal by some scholars that it be used to instilling a greater degree of
formal discipline on jōto tanpo transactions.243 Unfortunately, this would
not resolve ambiguities in the contractual paper, which is the potential
source of opportunism illustrated by this case.
In the pleadings, it is difficult to be fully sympathetic toward the claim
of either party. Okamura’s claim is clearly disingenuous, given the clear
evidence that he resumed collection efforts after the “transfer.” For
Nakano’s part, his attempt to avoid the two transfers of ownership registered
in the wake of his default appears to have little more than nuisance value.
The Civil Code hypothec securing the original loan was extinguished by
merger when Okamura took title, but this would be revived if the transfers to
Okamura and to Sano were found to be void.244 If the hypothec remains

240
Nakano v. Okamura, 1106 HANREI TAIMUZU 81, 84 (Jan. 15, 2003) (Sup. Ct. First Petty Bench,
Sep. 12, 2002).
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valid, the primary effect of Nakano’s petition would be to inconvenience the
third party purchaser Sano, by invalidating his title.
The Tokyo High Court accepted Nakano’s position, and declared both
transfers to be void.245 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Classifying
the original transfer as a jōto tanpo, the Court declared the sale to Sano
effective and final, and remanded the case for further hearings on the
accounting of Nakano’s remaining equity interest, if any.246
3.

The Supreme Court Declined the Invitation to Impose Special
Foreclosure Proceedings on Jōto Tanpo Transactions

This precedent prevents either party from using the Court as a tool for
inflicting gratuitous damage on the other. On the other hand, the facts of this
case do seem to invite the application of the Mortgages Act 1978 to jōto
tanpo transactions. This would resolve the problem, separate from the
transactional ambiguity referred to above, of disconnect between the
realization of the collateral and the accounting made of the debtor’s interest.
Despite the impact on Sano, adopting this approach could have a beneficial
impact. As common law courts learned from long experience with
unregistered mortgage practice, denying title to transferees is an effective
means of chasing transactions under the protective umbrella of an orderly
foreclosure procedure, where overreaching can be more effectively
controlled. 247 This is the aim of the analogous common law “clogs and
fetters” doctrine, which imposes the formal foreclosure process on any
transaction found to have the effect of creating a security interest in real
estate.248 By refusing to apply the Mortgages Act 1978 by analogy even
when no other viable option was contained in the pleadings, the Supreme
Court pointedly closed the door on this pathway to a “clogs and fetters”
doctrine based on existing procedural structures.
As in the case of Imai v. Takechi, the Supreme Court judgment in
Okamura v. Nakano reflects the Court’s recognition of the constraints of the
registration system. Holding jōto tanpo creditors to the procedural
requirements of a statutory mortgage by registration would require
abandonment of the curtain principle, a cost that the Court is unwilling to
incur. Given that imperative, and given the persistence of jōto tanpo
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Id. at 84. The official report of the case does not mention the trial court result.
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See supra Part II(A) & (C).
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transactions in business custom, the scope for judicial control of creditor
overreaching is limited.
The third and final case discussed below concerns another distinctive
feature of Japanese jōto tanpo doctrine: the relationship between the parties
after default, but in advance of an accounting or sale.
C.

Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate: Mortgagees in Possession Do Not Have
an Obligation to Maximize the Value of the Mortgagor’s Interest

The case of Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate arose during Japan’s “Bubble
Economy,” the frenzied period of rapid asset inflation that came to a close in
the early 1990s.249 Asano Shinpo owned Bito Shōji (Beautiful Metropolis
Trading).250 He set his sights on a potential development property that was
tied up by tenants with long-term land and building leases.251 He judged that
the total cost of the property, including purchase money and “departure
money” needed to buy out the lessees, would total roughly 200 million
yen.252 The steps in Asano’s simple plan—to purchase the land, to arrange
by some means for surrender by the tenants, and to cover these costs through
a sale—were a common pattern in the overheated market of the time.253 On
March 28, 1984, Asano borrowed 180 million yen from Sumimoto Takeichi,
a grey-market lender.254 The loan was secured by a jōto tanpo in favor of
Sumimoto, specifying direct foreclosure (i.e. an accounting to cut off the
borrower’s right of redemption) as the sole means of realizing the security.255
Sumimoto registered the transfer of ownership the following day, on March
29.256
Success in this transaction would have required that Asano find a
buyer willing to go forward with a purchase. However, he was unable to do
so. At the end of the loan term, on May 25, Asano paid four weeks’ advance
249
The “Bubble Economy” refers to the severe asset price inflation that afflicted the Japanese
economy in the late 1980s, the collapse of which is thought to mark the end of Japan’s long period of rapid
economic growth. See, e.g., Shigenori Shiratsuka, Asset Price Bubble in Japan in the 1980s: Lessons for
Financial and Macroeconomic Stability 1-3 (Inst. for Monetary and Econ. Stud., Discussion Paper No.
2003-E-15, 2003), available at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/publication/edps/2003/03-E-15.pdf.
250
Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate, 50 MINSHŪ 2702, 2731 (Sup. Ct., Second Petty Bench, Nov. 22,
1996).
251
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See Curtis Milhaupt & Mark West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and
Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 68-69 (2000).
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Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate, 50 MINSHŪ at 2702, 2731. In the text, “grey-market” lender refers to
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interest on the principle sum of 180,000,000 yen at four percent per month,
and renewed the loan for that period.257 This process was repeated on June
22, July 20, August 17, and September 14, each extension supported by a
replacement promissory note exchanged with Sumimoto. 258 Asano
continued to seek a buyer, and in July he was on the verge of concluding a
sale; however, that sale fell through at the last minute, nothing further
materialized, and on September 29, 1984, beset by his creditors, Asano
Shinpo took his own life.259
1.

Mortgagee Went into Possession, Mortgagor Sought to Impose an
Accounting

Around October of 1986, 260 Sumimoto began operating a parking
service on the property, which continued until the end of November 1991.261
During this interval, the heirs of Asano’s estate attempted to waive their
rights in the collateral and demand an accounting.262 Sumimoto refused to
comply, and the heirs filed suit to compel the settlement of accounts in
1992.263
In the time between the loan to Asano and the lawsuit by his heirs,
Japan’s Bubble Economy peaked, and then crashed,264 dragging down the
value of collateral. For purposes of the plaintiffs’ claim, the value of the
property on July 5, 1988 (the date of the plaintiffs’ demand for an
accounting) was determined to be 327,265,000 yen.265 After adjusting the
rate of interest to bring it within the legal limit, the amount outstanding on
the loan at the same point in time was fixed at 250,700,780 yen.266 Plaintiffs
sought to recover the difference between those two sums.
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Evidence of Forgery in the Record Highlights the Potential for
Mortgagee Opportunism

Sumimoto presented two core claims in defense. The first depended
on a second contract of conveyance dated April 26, 1984, which included an
option to repurchase the property for 212,654,000 yen, expiring on August
26, 1984. Sumimoto asserted that this conveyance had terminated the jōto
tanpo agreement four months before Asano’s death.267 To bolster this claim,
at the third trial court hearing in the case, Sumimoto’s counsel proffered a
document bearing Asano’s seal, which purported to agree to a final
settlement of the jōto tanpo by offering the collateral as substitute
performance of his obligations under the loan. 268 On the date of this
document (April 26), the land had an appraised value of 134,250,000 yen,269
which would have meant that Sumimoto agreed at that point to take a loss on
the transaction. Counsel proposed that this completed the loan agreement.270
The court was not persuaded. The trial judge found the memorandum of
consent to be a forgery and refused to treat the second contract as a genuine
sale, in light of Asano’s subsequent payments of interest on the full amount
of the loan, the absence of any evidence that Sumimoto had given notice of
any accounting settlement, and the failure of Sumimoto to register the
second contract in the full month between the expiration of the option and
Asano’s suicide.271 The trial court held that, like the first agreement, the
second contract created an executory jōto tanpo between Asano and
Sumimoto, under which Asano retained an equitable interest in the
property.272
3.

Granting Mortgagor the Power to Demand an Accounting Would
Deny the Mortgagee Control over the Timing of a Sale

In the alternative, Sumimoto asserted that the debtor in a jōto tanpo
relationship cannot compel the creditor to complete an accounting and
terminate the relationship until the creditor signals his intention to realize the
collateral.273 Under existing precedent, this condition would be satisfied by
one of three events: 1) sale to a third party; 2) notice of intent to claim
unencumbered ownership; or 3) notice that the obligation exceeds the value
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
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of the property. 274 Because none of these events transpired, and because
Asano’s heirs had no interest in redeeming the property (after 1990 it had
declined greatly in value), counsel for Sumimoto maintained that the duty to
account never arose.275
Both the Osaka District Court and the Osaka High Court held for
Asano’s heirs, and ordered that an accounting be made.276 The Supreme
Court reversed, adopting Sumimoto’s conditional accounting argument in its
judgment, reasoning that the contrary rule would permit speculation by the
debtor and deny the secured lender the value of its security.277
4.

Irrelevance of Mortgagee Entry into Possession

Setting aside the matter of forgery, this result makes sense but for one
fact: the entry into possession by the mortgagee. Given that his claim was
limited to sums due, a mortgagee in possession of property with a value that
significantly exceeds the sums it secures has little incentive to put the
collateral to productive use. Taking the Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate case as
an example, the value of the property would have increased substantially
during the three years between October 1986 and the collapse of the Bubble
Economy in 1990; it is questionable whether its highest and best use was as
a parking lot. English law addresses the moral hazard that arises under these
conditions by affixing a mortgagee in possession with an affirmative duty to
maximize the income derived from the property for the benefit of the
debtor.278 This is one of the reasons that mortgagees in England generally
seek possession only with a view to an immediate sale.279
5.

The Judgment in Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate Is Grounded in
Doctrinal Formalism

The Supreme Court’s indifference to the state of possession speaks to
the historical origins of the jōto tanpo interest. As related above, both
possessory and non-possessory pledges of land were known to Tokugawa
274
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land practice, and both persisted into the early Meiji era. 280 With the
introduction of the Civil Code, the informal practice of “title-transfer
security” was championed by the Code’s drafters on the grounds of
contractual freedom.281 To support this view, the courts applied what might
be described as a “thin trust” concept to these transactions, under which
mandatory provisions of the Civil Code and the register continued to
determine property relations with third parties, while the “inner
relationship”282 between mortgagor and mortgagee was entirely governed by
agreement between the parties.283 Because the primary doctrinal objective
was to insulate these transactions from the terms of the Civil Code, courts
did not interpret the “trust” or “trust-like” verbiage to impose special duties
on the trustee; therefore, the state of possession was treated as a term for the
parties to settle between themselves. As the Sumimoto decision illustrates,
the Supreme Court has remained true to these roots, favoring the
preservation of a narrow doctrinal integrity over commercial fairness and
efficiency.
In argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for Sumimoto stressed
that Asano’s heirs were pursuing a selfish gain in attempting to obtain an
accounting during the boom phase of the market.284 While this is certainly
the case, Sumimoto also kept his options open. The second contract, for sale
with an option to repurchase, is inherently ambiguous and invites
opportunism by the lender: modeled as a jōto tanpo, it leaves the lender (in a
falling market) free to pursue the borrower for sums due; if modeled as a
sale, the lender (in a rising market) is free to stand on the option and retain
interest payments made in the interim. From the fact findings in the case, it
appears that Sumimoto attempted to remove the speculative ambiguity of the
transaction after the fact through forgery.
D.

Under Current Precedent, Mortgagee Opportunism Within the Jōto
Tanpo Relationship Is Not Susceptible to Judicial Discipline

As the cases above illustrate, inefficiencies arise from the potential for
ambiguity in contract paper and the limitations of the registration system;
but the core of the inflexibility of judicial treatment lies in the “thin trust”
280
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concept that underpins the jōto tanpo interest. Where a security arrangement
is identified on the facts, the doctrinal separation of “inner relations” and
“outer relations” under a thin trust dictates that preference must be given to
the register. The same thin-trust framework inhibits the courts from policing
creditor opportunism within the scope of “inner relations” between the
original parties to the transaction. Given these consequences of the thintrust concept, opportunism within the jōto tanpo relationship cannot be fully
controlled through the further refinement of judicial doctrine. This series of
unfortunate circumstances gives pause to consider whether sustaining jōto
tanpo as a viable security interest is an appropriate objective. If jōto tanpo
performs no function that is not equally well served by the orthodox
hypothec and root hypothec interests, it may be appropriate to reverse the
policy of sustaining its value.
V.

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The historical role of jōto tanpo was to help creditors and debtors skirt
inadequacies in Japan’s system for enforcing secured claims in real property;
but a jōto tanpo in real estate, by its very nature, creates an off-register
interest that raises problems of information asymmetry. As a result, jōto
tanpo arrangements have always been afflicted by problems of strategic
bargaining and opportunism. Nonetheless, when the enforcement system
was particularly broken—and during a period of particularly rapid economic
expansion—jōto tanpo helped to support the transactions that other security
interests could not reach.285 Today, the terrain has shifted. Japan has greatly
reformed its civil enforcement system and, by most accounts, the system is
now performing well. 286 This has changed creditor behavior and,
accordingly, the role played by jōto tanpo in real estate transactions. Its use
has declined, and the latter two of the three cases discussed above illustrate
the niche that it fills today: a halfway house between default and execution,
favored by lenders whose business model does not depend on a reputation
for patient equanimity.
The litigation environment has also changed substantially since the
heyday of non-Code security interests in real estate. The Japanese courts
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processed more than four times the number of cases in 2005 than 1975.287
Over the same period, the total staff contingent of the court system has
grown by less than four percent. 288 Benefits of office automation
notwithstanding, the pressures on judicial time are far greater today than in
the past. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the progressive refinement of
jōto tanpo rules, the Japanese Supreme Court has (to borrow a phrase from
Professor Carol Rose) preferred “crystals” to “mud,” 289 formalism over
flexibility.
This is evident in the treatment of third-party transfers, where the
Court has held firmly to a rule that can be applied on the face of the register,
with a minimum of supplementary fact-finding. By ruling the doctrine of
notice inapplicable to third-party transfers, courts are able to evaluate
transfers without looking behind them. This rule contributes to the faster
disposition of cases, but it is also an example of legal hypertrophy—
insistence on the ever more exacting adherence to a principle that actually
aggravates an underlying problem.290
Certain inefficiencies are inherent in the jōto tanpo form in the current
state of the law, including the ambiguous foundation of the relationship
itself, the temptations to forgery, the impossibility of imposing a
comprehensive foreclosure action, and the possibility of attachment in the
hands of the lender. These inefficiencies dictate that such transactions will
continue to be an engine of litigation. In the modern environment, a root
hypothec provides adequate security for the lender, without these risks and
inefficiencies. As Professor Grant Nelson has argued with respect to the
analogous contract for deed in the United States,291 it would be preferable to
normalize the jōto tanpo and bring it within the mainstream framework—
now well tested—for realizing security.
A.

Foreign Examples, Although a Useful Reference, Are Not Directly
Applicable to the Japanese Context

As the case of Nakano v. Okamura illustrates, jōto tanpo presents a
special difficulty for Japan’s system of title registration because the lender
287
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holds ostensible title to the collateral.292 As indicated in the discussion of
that case, the English courts have chosen to discourage equitable mortgages
(in which the borrower is the ostensible owner, and the lender has only an
equitable claim), simply by refusing to recognize that passing the certificate
of title registration to the lender has any legal effect. 293 The jōto tanpo
transaction cannot be so easily discouraged. In the state of Louisiana, where
the property system also has civil law roots, a security interest can be created
in exactly the same way as a jōto tanpo, using an outright conveyance to the
lender, accompanied by a counter-letter promising reconveyance to the
borrower upon repayment. 294 However, there is again an important
difference from Japan: Louisiana conveyancing is supported by a system of
recorded deeds,295 under which the borrower is able to protect his interest
simply by filing the counter-letter that he receives from the creditor. 296
Unlike Japan (with its system of registered title), in Louisiana there are no
special formal restrictions on what may be filed; the document is simply
added to the public record, for possible reference in case of future dispute.
In the event that the creditor sells the collateral to a third party, the correct
result for the court is straightforward: if the counter-letter has been filed, the
borrower’s interest is protected; if the counter-letter has not been filed, his
interest is not.297 Because Japanese property registers are organized not as a
deed recording system, but as a system of registered title, the borrower who
once conveys title to his lender thereby loses access to the entry, and cannot
register his (equitable) right to a reconveyance of the property.
When it comes to the jōto tanpo against real estate, Japanese judges
are thus presented with an indigestible cocktail—a permissive contractual
approach to security similar to that of Louisiana, backed up by a strict
registration system similar to that of England. Strict application of the
curtain principle (i.e. honoring all transactions that are based upon the
content of the register) has the effect of encouraging jōto tanpo transactions,
despite their inefficiency. Judicial precedent has very nearly reached its
limit; a full resolution to this dilemma will require legislative intervention.
As demonstrated by the Mortgages Act 1978, enhanced powers of judicial
management can be a key to discouraging opportunistic use of an interest.

292
293
294
295
296
297

See supra Part IV(B).
United Bank of Kuwait PLC v. Sahib, [1997] Ch. 107 (1996) (U.K.); see supra Part IV(A)(4).
See, e.g., Livingstone’s Executrix v. Story, 36 U.S. 351 (1837).
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3338.
See State ex rel. Herbert v. Recorder of Mortgages, 143 So. 15 (1932).
Id.

506

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

B.

VOL. 18 NO. 3

The Special Character of Jōto Tanpo Against Real Estate Could Be
Clarified By Explicit Statutory Recognition

One of the doctrinal difficulties of current law is that jōto tanpo
against both movables and immovables is sustained by the same thin-trust
concept, using the same terminology.298 The bulk of jōto tanpo litigation
relates to secured claims in movables, where it plays a vital economic role as
the only available form of non-possessory security. Explicit statutory
recognition of jōto tanpo in real estate as a discrete type of security interest
would make it clear that these are separate threads of law and would support
the independent development of rules appropriate to the physical and legal
character of the respective assets involved.
Under current doctrine, both the stated cause of a transfer of
ownership and the actual cause are ignored. As indicated by the Supreme
Court in Sumimoto v. Asano’s Estate, this is intended to reduce the
transaction costs of conveyancing by encouraging purchasers to trust the
content of the register.299 Paradoxically, this rule increases the fact-finding
burden on courts by enabling and rewarding obfuscation of the true intention
behind such transfers.
The cause of registration that ultimately appears on the register is
drawn from a recitation in the contract of conveyance, which must accord
with a similar recitation in the power of attorney that authorizes the change
to the register. Both of these documents must bear the debtor’s seal, and it is
therefore within the debtor’s power to negotiate over the published
characterization of the transaction. However, the debtor has a much reduced
incentive to do so, because neither actual nor constructive notice affect the
power of the creditor to convey good title to a third party. The creditor, on
the other hand, benefits in two ways from concealing the character of the
transaction from the register. First, this preserves the possibility of
speculation, as seen in Nakano v. Okamura.300 Second, because jōto tanpo is
known to be both afflicted by legal ambiguity and associated with lenders
who operate on the fringes of the law, risk-averse purchasers will discount or
avoid properties with a jōto tanpo registration in the chain of title, reducing
their sale value.
Application of the doctrine of notice would give the debtor an
incentive to negotiate for the explicit characterization of jōto tanpo as the
298
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cause of registration. This would both reduce the burdens of fact finding in
litigation, and provide a foundation for the more orderly disposition of
collateral. Binding takers with actual notice of a jōto tanpo that has not been
registered would reduce the potential for creditors to avoid this rule. The
effect of the doctrine of notice would be to force the parties into a bilateral
monopoly, which may result in deadlock if the parties cannot agree on a
valuation of the collateral. Permitting conversion of a jōto tanpo interest to
a root hypothec on petition by either party would cover this contingency, by
providing an orderly exit path from the relationship. Finally, statutory
recognition would open the path to affixing lenders in possession with an
explicit duty to maximize the value of the collateral, whether through sale or
through management of the property.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Japanese property system has undergone considerable elaboration
and development since the release of restraints on alienation by the Meiji
reformers. The jōto tanpo interest has played an important role in that
transformation. This history and its outcomes provide important insight into
the internal dynamics of a young property system undergoing change.
Each phase of legal development examined in this Article, from the
watershed settlement of alienable rights of ownership onward, was shaped in
important ways by experience with preexisting interests. Reformers at each
stage have faced considerable pressure from contemporary stakeholders to
cover, at minimum, the known transactional needs of the time. The
successful adoption and development of the Japanese property system
suggests that the rights it has deployed, in whatever form, have been
sufficiently flexible to cover those transactional needs, and were consistently
backed up, through whatever procedure, by adequate legal mechanisms for
their enforcement.
This incremental narrative contrasts with the persistent view that
Japan presents a hopeful sort of paradox: a market system that has
succeeded despite systematic enforcement failure.301 As a recent study put it,
Japan’s new property law was “not matched by the development of
complementary enforcement mechanisms,” 302 a shortcoming overcome by
spontaneous extra-legal factors such that “[t]his gap did not prove to be
301
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wholly problematic.”303 The above survey of the historical role of jōto tanpo
in real estate transactions suggests that the first recourse for parties frustrated
by inadequate enforcement mechanisms is to seek alternatives within the
state-sponsored legal framework itself. If that is so, and if they find those
alternatives—as they seem to have done in this instance—then the
availability of enforcement may be more important than this view might
otherwise suggest.
The jōto tanpo against real estate with an opportunity for forfeiture, as
an adaptation of feudal-era practice, took root as a customary form of
“mortgage,” in the early decades of the Japanese system of private
ownership. Its subsequent recognition under the Civil Code was justified on
the narrow ideological assumption that introducing contractual freedom into
the core of property law would produce economic benefits. The interest
served an important role as a tool for secured lending during the nation’s
early period of industrialization. During the swell in economic activity in
the second half of the twentieth century, however, its inefficiencies, which
manifested themselves in the form of hardship on the debtor and rude
surprises for his general creditors, attracted judicial intervention. Since that
time, resort to this interest has been incrementally curtailed, until today,
where it is primarily associated with collection efforts against debtors
already in distress. The position of jōto tanpo within the universe of real
estate transactions is thus not the result of enforcement failure, but of
enforcement arbitrage.
Japan’s property system, on the contrary, can be said to have been
afflicted by a surfeit of enforcement. During the period of rapid
development, the entrepreneurial exercise of substantive legal rights to
achieve inequitable results threatened the perceived legitimacy of legal
institutions themselves. The restrictions on execution officers introduced by
the Bailiffs Act of 1966304 were a response to this challenge. The same can
be said of the root hypothec added to the Civil Code in 1969, 305 of the
Mortgages Act 1978,306 of the procedural reform of auction and attachment
proceedings introduced in 1979,307 and of the removal of the super-priority
for short-term leases in 2003.308 Each of these reforms reduced the relative
attractiveness of the non-Code security devices, but the first of them—the
303
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Bailiffs Act of 1966—had the effect of weakening, not strengthening, the
civil enforcement system.
Hemmed in by the constraints of the real estate registration system
and the Civil Code, jōto tanpo has reached its natural limits as a judicial
construct. The need to protect the integrity of registration, together with the
pressures of judicial administration, have driven the courts to adopt a highly
formalistic and inflexible approach to this ostensibly equitable transaction.
It remains to be seen whether the current round of revisions to the property
section of the Civil Code will touch the jōto tanpo in real estate; but it
nonetheless seems inevitable that the inherent flaws of this transactional
form will invite a response in due course. Time will tell what form it takes.

